INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 720
by B. Raman
The Faisal Base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) located about 10 KMs from the Karachi internationl airport is what the PAF calls a Joint User airfield. It is used by the PAF and the air arms of the Pakistan Army and Navy as well as by the VVIP squadron. All air surveillance movements over the sea --- whether by the PAF or by the Army or by the PN--- are controlled from this base.
2. Since 1975, the operating base of the Naval Air Arm, called PNS Mehran, is located inside this airfield. All senior officers of the Naval Air Arm operate from PNS Mehran. The Naval Air Arm at PNS Mehran is headed by Commander Naval Aviation (COMNAV). Under him there are four Heads of Department (HOD) designated as Commander Air (Cdr Air), Commander Air Engineering Department (Cdr AED), Commanding Officer MEHRAN (CO MEH) and Officer Commanding Naval Aviation Training School (OC NATS).
3. The squadrons of the Naval Air Arm are stationed in PNS Mehran. These are the P3C Orion Squadron (28 Sqn), the Atlantic Squadron (29 Sqn), the Fokker Squadron (27 Sqn), the Seaking Squadron (111 Sqn) and the Alouette Squadron (333 Sqn).
4. While the Naval Air Arm was raised primarily to provide maritime surveillance capability against India, it has been playing, in addition, a counter-terrorism role since the U.S. started its Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October,2001. This counter-terrorism role consists of air surveillance to prevent any sea-borne intrusions of Al Qaeda and to detect any terrorist plans for attacks on ships bringing supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The supplies are landed in the Karachi port and then moved by trucks to Afghanistan.
5. While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the U.S.-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the U.S.-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprises naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes.
6. On November 16,2004,the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced that it had accepted Pakistan’s request to buy seven P-3C Orion aircraft with T-56 turboprop engines, communications equipment, training devices, medical services, support and test equipment, engineering technical services, supply support, operation and maintenance training, documentation, spare/repair parts, publications, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost would be $970 million.
7.The DSCA announcement added: "The command-and-control capabilities of these aircraft will improve Pakistan’s ability to restrict the littoral movement of terrorists along Pakistan’s southern border and ensure Pakistan’s overall ability to maintain integrity of their borders. Pakistan intends to use the proposed purchase to develop a long needed fleet of maritime and border surveillance aircraft. The addition of these aircraft will provide Pakistan with search, surveillance, and control capability in support of maritime interdiction operations and increase their ability to support the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom Operations; anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare capabilities; and a control capability over land against transnational terrorists and narcotics smugglers. The modernization will enhance the capabilities of the Pakistani Navy and support its regional influence and meet its legitimate self-defense needs. Pakistan is capable of absorbing and maintaining these additional aircraft in its inventory.”
8. The first two of these aircraft were delivered in April 2010 and officially inducted into the Naval Air Arm at a function held at PNS Mehran on June 2,2010. Some more of the remaining five have since been inducted, but their number is not known. These planes are generally kept in hangars belonging to the Naval Air Arm and operate from the joint user airfield.
9. The active role played by the Pakistani Navy in support of the NATO operations in Afghanistan has attracted the anger of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On March 4, 2008, two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
10. On December 2,2009, an alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest. One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
11. Two Pakistani naval personnel--- a commissioned officer of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant and a sailor--- were among four persons killed in two separate but coordinated explosions in Karachi on April 26, 2011. The explosions targeted two buses of the Pakistan Navy which were transporting naval personnel to their places of work. According to available indications, the improvised explosive devices, which struck the buses, had been planted along routes normally taken by the buses and activated through mobile telephones.
12. According to the "Daily Times" of Lahore ( April 27,2011), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, claimed the responsibility for the blasts, and threatened more attacks on security forces. The claim was made in a telephone call to a foreign news agency by a person who identified himself as Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman of the Taliban. He reportedly said: "Security forces will be targeted in the future as well, because they are killing their own people in Waziristan and elsewhere at the behest of the United States.”
13. Since the raid by the Pakistani military commandos into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July,2007, there has been a number of retaliatory attacks by the TTP against the Army, the Air Force, the Special Services Group (SSG), the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the para-military forces and the police. It is, however, believed that the attacks on the Navy were connected to its role in providing maritime support to the NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Navy had no role to play in the Lal Masjid raid. The Pakistani authorities have been apprehending a surge in these attacks on the security forces, including the Navy, in retaliation for the raid by U.S. naval commandos into the residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011, in which OBL was killed.
14. At around 10 PM on the night of May 22, an unidentified group of about 15 terrorists armed with explosives, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and assault weapons was reported to have managed to infiltrate into the PNS Mehran base through a side of the Faisal PAF base where a PAF museum is located and engaged in a fire fight with naval and other security personnel after destroying at least one----according to some other reports two---PC 3 aircraft kept in the hangars. The fire-fight was still going on at 3 AM on the morning of May 23 when last reports came in.
15. It has been reported that the survivors among the attackers have taken some hostages and taken shelter inside a building in the base. According to unconfirmed reports, among the hostages are one or more Chinese military personnel working in the base. It has been further reported that some Americans and Turks were also working in the base. It is not known whether any of them has been taken hostage. At least 11 naval personnel are reported to have died in the fire fight so far. No one has claimed responsibility till now.
16. The daring attack and the inability of the Navy to prevent it are likely to add to the feelings of humiliation in the Pakistani Armed Forces which have been prevalent since the Abbottabad raid. To deflect anger over the security failure at PNS Mehran, attempts could be made to divert suspicion against India. Extra vigilance and extra security would be required along our coast in general and in the Mumbai area in particular. Instructions should be issued to all concerned to avoid any statements and comments which could aggravate the paranoia of the Pakistani Armed Forces and to refrain from exhibiting any sense of glee over the discomfiture of the Pakistani Armed Forces.(23-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Monday, May 23, 2011
Sunday, May 22, 2011
CHINA : ALL THE WAY WITH PAKISTAN
by B.RAMAN
China has gone all the way with Pakistan in the difficult situation being faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of the Abbottabad raid by some U.S. naval commandos on May 2, which led to the death of Osama bin Laden.
2. This became apparent during the just concluded (May 20,2011) four-day visit of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to China during which he met, among others, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The visit had been fixed weeks before the Abbottabad raid to mark the high-profile observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but as it took place a few days after the raid, Pakistan ’s much-doubted sincerity in fighting terrorism became the defining and dominating theme of the visit.
3. Even before Gilani’s departure for China , the Chinese authorities had made it clear in no uncertain terms on many occasions that they did not share the skepticism being expressed in the U.S. regarding the sincerity of Pakistan in the so-called war against terrorism. The Chinese also refrained from subscribing to the view that to have been able to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad, OBL must have had some local support from official circles in Pakistan . They had no hesitation in endorsing the claims made by Pakistan that its security forces had made huge sacrifices in the war against terrorism.
4. These points were reiterated with even greater force by the Chinese during their interactions with Gilani after his arrival in China . It was apparent that the Chinese leaders have had no difficulty in accepting the claims of Pakistan that it was taken by surprise by OBL being found in Abbottabad. While refraining from any comments that could have been misinterpreted as criticism of the unilateral U.S. raid to kill OBL, the Chinese underlined their own preference for joint operations with Pakistan in dealing with the Uighur dissidents operating on both sides of Pakistan’s border with the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The Chinese also refrained from any remarks that could be interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on the post-Abbottabad anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the U.S. Chinese analysts stressed the importance of continuing Pakistani counter-terrorism co-operation with the U.S. on the one side and with China on the other.
5. During his meeting with Gilani, Hu promised to increase cooperation with Pakistan on fighting terrorism and cross-border crimes in a bid to create a sound security environment for the economic and social development of both countries. Hu expressed his appreciation of Pakistan ’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, and said China would promote security dialogue and coordination with Pakistan. He said China would join Pakistan in the fight against drug trafficking, cross-border crimes and the "three evil forces"--terrorism, extremism and splittism.
6. Pakistani journalists who had accompanied Gilani have claimed that during his meeting with Gilani, Wen said that Pakistan had made great sacrifices in the global war against terrorism and urged the international community to understand and support Pakistan's efforts to maintain domestic stability and advance the economic and social development. They also quoted Wen as telling Gilani that "Pakistan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected," and as disclosing that China had asked the U.S. to respect Pakistan ’s sovereignty, understand its problems, address its concerns and acknowledge the sacrifices rendered by it in the war against terror. China was reported to have made this point to the U.S. during a recent strategic dialogue between the two countries in Washington DC.
7. The strong Chinese support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue was also underlined in the joint statement ussued by the two countries at the end of the visit on May 20. The statement inter alia said: “China believes that Pakistan ’s efforts for promoting peace and stability in South Asia need to be recognised and supported. The Chinese side recognised the tremendous efforts and great sacrifice that Pakistan has made in fighting terrorism and reiterated its respect and support for Pakistan ’s efforts to advance its counter-terrorism strategy and safeguard its security.”
8. In a commentary on the visit carried on May 18, the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” said: “Due to special causes in various aspects, such as historical and tribal influences, the 'three forces' headed by the 'East Turkistan Islamic Movement' have existed for a long time in the tribal areas at the Pakistani-Afghan border. However, China has always respected Pakistan 's sovereignty when combating the 'three forces' jointly with Pakistan and understands Pakistan's enormous sacrifices and significant contributions in the forefront of the international fight against terrorism. Pakistan has also always supported China 's sovereignty and territorial integrity in major issues related to the Taiwan region, Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.”
9. In a commentary published on May 20 in the Government-controlled “China Daily”, Han Hua, associate professor at Peking University's School of International Studies, said: “Instead of creating a gulf in relations, the death of bin Laden has offered a chance to Pakistan, the U.S. and China to work together to combat terrorism. After all, the three countries' anti-terrorism mission is still very much on.”
10. Thus, the following points relating to the Chinese position have come out loud and clear from the visit:
- China welcomes the death of OBL as a result of the U.S. raid.
- Despite the success of the raid which was organized unilaterally by the U.S., it stresses the importance of respecting Pakistan ’s sovereignty.
- Pakistan’s failure to detect the presence of OBL at Abbottabad does not detract from the sacrifices made by it in the war against terrorism. These sacrifices have to be recognized.
- China has no intention to capitalize on the U.S. misgivings about Pakistan to wean Pakistan away from the U.S.
- Continuing counter-terrorism co-operation between Pakistan and the U.S. would benefit the war against global terrorism which continues despite OBL’s death.
11. Though India has not figured in any of the statements and reports emanating from China on Gilani’s visit, reading between the lines one could infer that Pakistan ’s concerns over its ability to prevent any Indian air intrusions into Pakistan must have figured in the discussions. The reported Chinese agreement to expedite the supply of 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force during the next six months strengthens this inference.
12. The “Daily Times” of Lahore has commented on this as follows in its report: “According to official sources, these aircraft will be equipped with sophisticated avionics. Not only will the aircraft be handed over within weeks, China will also foot the bill initially. Although Pakistan and China have been jointly developing this multirole combat aircraft in the past, in the aftermath of the U.S. operation in Abbottabad, serious questions have been raised about Pakistan ’s defence capabilities. According to a strategic expert, the speedy delivery of 50 pieces of this aircraft, originally to be done over two years, is expected to allay apprehensions of not only the Pakistani public but will also send a message to the world that Pakistan ’s defence is not weak. It might be remembered that not only has the Indian military chief speculated on the possibility of a U.S.-style strike from the Indian side to take out jihadi outfits in Pakistan, there has been escalation on the Pakistan-India border near Sialkot recently. Also, observers believe that in a situation when the speculations are rife that Pakistan may not be able to resist another U.S. attack inside its territory if it so decides, this agreement will send a clear message to the world on which side China stands.” (22-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
-------------------------------------------------
My comment: This analysis reflects an understanding (by the Chinese) that Pakistan is wont to play both sides; that Pakistan remains vulnerable to both China and the U.S.; that China’s strategic involvement in Pakistan is not driven by sentiment alone. As such, China’s involvement seeks to focus on practical goals; specifically, mitigating the threat of Islamic terrorism within its own sphere.
Furthermore, it employs the now failed Bush policy of encircling the perceived enemy (Iran) by establishing useful bases on either side of it (Iraq and Afghanistan); and now, figuring in China’s calculations: India (in the middle) with Pakistan and China surrounding it.
China has gone all the way with Pakistan in the difficult situation being faced by Pakistan in the aftermath of the Abbottabad raid by some U.S. naval commandos on May 2, which led to the death of Osama bin Laden.
2. This became apparent during the just concluded (May 20,2011) four-day visit of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to China during which he met, among others, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. The visit had been fixed weeks before the Abbottabad raid to mark the high-profile observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but as it took place a few days after the raid, Pakistan ’s much-doubted sincerity in fighting terrorism became the defining and dominating theme of the visit.
3. Even before Gilani’s departure for China , the Chinese authorities had made it clear in no uncertain terms on many occasions that they did not share the skepticism being expressed in the U.S. regarding the sincerity of Pakistan in the so-called war against terrorism. The Chinese also refrained from subscribing to the view that to have been able to live undetected for over five years at Abbottabad, OBL must have had some local support from official circles in Pakistan . They had no hesitation in endorsing the claims made by Pakistan that its security forces had made huge sacrifices in the war against terrorism.
4. These points were reiterated with even greater force by the Chinese during their interactions with Gilani after his arrival in China . It was apparent that the Chinese leaders have had no difficulty in accepting the claims of Pakistan that it was taken by surprise by OBL being found in Abbottabad. While refraining from any comments that could have been misinterpreted as criticism of the unilateral U.S. raid to kill OBL, the Chinese underlined their own preference for joint operations with Pakistan in dealing with the Uighur dissidents operating on both sides of Pakistan’s border with the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The Chinese also refrained from any remarks that could be interpreted as an attempt to capitalize on the post-Abbottabad anti-U.S. sentiments in Pakistan to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the U.S. Chinese analysts stressed the importance of continuing Pakistani counter-terrorism co-operation with the U.S. on the one side and with China on the other.
5. During his meeting with Gilani, Hu promised to increase cooperation with Pakistan on fighting terrorism and cross-border crimes in a bid to create a sound security environment for the economic and social development of both countries. Hu expressed his appreciation of Pakistan ’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, and said China would promote security dialogue and coordination with Pakistan. He said China would join Pakistan in the fight against drug trafficking, cross-border crimes and the "three evil forces"--terrorism, extremism and splittism.
6. Pakistani journalists who had accompanied Gilani have claimed that during his meeting with Gilani, Wen said that Pakistan had made great sacrifices in the global war against terrorism and urged the international community to understand and support Pakistan's efforts to maintain domestic stability and advance the economic and social development. They also quoted Wen as telling Gilani that "Pakistan's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected," and as disclosing that China had asked the U.S. to respect Pakistan ’s sovereignty, understand its problems, address its concerns and acknowledge the sacrifices rendered by it in the war against terror. China was reported to have made this point to the U.S. during a recent strategic dialogue between the two countries in Washington DC.
7. The strong Chinese support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue was also underlined in the joint statement ussued by the two countries at the end of the visit on May 20. The statement inter alia said: “China believes that Pakistan ’s efforts for promoting peace and stability in South Asia need to be recognised and supported. The Chinese side recognised the tremendous efforts and great sacrifice that Pakistan has made in fighting terrorism and reiterated its respect and support for Pakistan ’s efforts to advance its counter-terrorism strategy and safeguard its security.”
8. In a commentary on the visit carried on May 18, the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” said: “Due to special causes in various aspects, such as historical and tribal influences, the 'three forces' headed by the 'East Turkistan Islamic Movement' have existed for a long time in the tribal areas at the Pakistani-Afghan border. However, China has always respected Pakistan 's sovereignty when combating the 'three forces' jointly with Pakistan and understands Pakistan's enormous sacrifices and significant contributions in the forefront of the international fight against terrorism. Pakistan has also always supported China 's sovereignty and territorial integrity in major issues related to the Taiwan region, Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.”
9. In a commentary published on May 20 in the Government-controlled “China Daily”, Han Hua, associate professor at Peking University's School of International Studies, said: “Instead of creating a gulf in relations, the death of bin Laden has offered a chance to Pakistan, the U.S. and China to work together to combat terrorism. After all, the three countries' anti-terrorism mission is still very much on.”
10. Thus, the following points relating to the Chinese position have come out loud and clear from the visit:
- China welcomes the death of OBL as a result of the U.S. raid.
- Despite the success of the raid which was organized unilaterally by the U.S., it stresses the importance of respecting Pakistan ’s sovereignty.
- Pakistan’s failure to detect the presence of OBL at Abbottabad does not detract from the sacrifices made by it in the war against terrorism. These sacrifices have to be recognized.
- China has no intention to capitalize on the U.S. misgivings about Pakistan to wean Pakistan away from the U.S.
- Continuing counter-terrorism co-operation between Pakistan and the U.S. would benefit the war against global terrorism which continues despite OBL’s death.
11. Though India has not figured in any of the statements and reports emanating from China on Gilani’s visit, reading between the lines one could infer that Pakistan ’s concerns over its ability to prevent any Indian air intrusions into Pakistan must have figured in the discussions. The reported Chinese agreement to expedite the supply of 50 JF-17 Thunder aircraft to the Pakistan Air Force during the next six months strengthens this inference.
12. The “Daily Times” of Lahore has commented on this as follows in its report: “According to official sources, these aircraft will be equipped with sophisticated avionics. Not only will the aircraft be handed over within weeks, China will also foot the bill initially. Although Pakistan and China have been jointly developing this multirole combat aircraft in the past, in the aftermath of the U.S. operation in Abbottabad, serious questions have been raised about Pakistan ’s defence capabilities. According to a strategic expert, the speedy delivery of 50 pieces of this aircraft, originally to be done over two years, is expected to allay apprehensions of not only the Pakistani public but will also send a message to the world that Pakistan ’s defence is not weak. It might be remembered that not only has the Indian military chief speculated on the possibility of a U.S.-style strike from the Indian side to take out jihadi outfits in Pakistan, there has been escalation on the Pakistan-India border near Sialkot recently. Also, observers believe that in a situation when the speculations are rife that Pakistan may not be able to resist another U.S. attack inside its territory if it so decides, this agreement will send a clear message to the world on which side China stands.” (22-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
-------------------------------------------------
My comment: This analysis reflects an understanding (by the Chinese) that Pakistan is wont to play both sides; that Pakistan remains vulnerable to both China and the U.S.; that China’s strategic involvement in Pakistan is not driven by sentiment alone. As such, China’s involvement seeks to focus on practical goals; specifically, mitigating the threat of Islamic terrorism within its own sphere.
Furthermore, it employs the now failed Bush policy of encircling the perceived enemy (Iran) by establishing useful bases on either side of it (Iraq and Afghanistan); and now, figuring in China’s calculations: India (in the middle) with Pakistan and China surrounding it.
Friday, May 20, 2011
View from India: TERROR LIST GOOF-UP
by B.RAMAN
In March, our Ministry of Home Affairs had given to its Pakistani counterpart a list of 50 terrorists----Indian as well as Pakistani nationals--- who were suspected to have been involved in acts of terrorism in India. The Pakistani authorities were requested to have them arrested and handed over to India for trial.
India had been giving such lists to Pakistan ever since the Khalistani terrorists hijacked some aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Pakistan in the 1980s. Initially, the lists included mostly the names of Khalistani terrorists who were operating from Pakistan. Subsequently, the lists were expanded in the 1990's to include the names of some terrorists from Jammu & Kashmir and the absconding accused of the 1993 blasts in Mumbai, including Dawood Ibrahim and his associates.
Till about 2004, this list had a total of about 20 names. It has since expanded to 50 due to the search for the absconding accused in post-2004 jihadi acts of terrorism. Pakistan used to deny the presence of any Indian national in its territory. In respect of the Pakistani nationals figuring in the Indian lists, its response used to be that India had not been able to produce any evidence regarding their involvement in terrorism.
This exercise had been going on for nearly 30 years without Pakistan taking any action to trace those wanted by India and arresting and handing them over. Before handing them over to Pakistan, the lists used to be vetted by a joint committee consisting of officers of all agencies and the State Police. A senior officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) used to chair this committee. The representatives of the State Police were required to confirm that the lists were correct.
No errors in the preparation of these lists had occurred in the past due to the systematic vetting of the lists by all agencies sitting jointly for the purpose before handing them over to Pakistan.
This procedure does not appear to have been followed in the case of the latest list of 50 wanted terrorists. As a result, the names of at least two suspects, who had been arrested in India and hence were not absconding, found their way into the list which showed them as hiding in Pakistan.
The U.S. naval commando raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 and his death during the raid have given rise to considerable criticism in the U.S. regarding the alleged role of Pakistan in sheltering wanted terrorists. Presumably to capitalize on the growing public criticism of Pakistan for giving shelter to terrorists, the MHA apparently decided to make the latest list available to the media in order to highlight Pakistan’s non-cooperation in tracing and arresting terrorists wanted in India.
Journalists of the “Times of India” and NDTV, who scrutinized the list, found out that two of the terrorists shown in the list as hiding in Pakistan were actually in India.
This has created considerable embarrassment for the Govt. of India. Though there was no mala fide intention on the part of the MHA, its failure to detect these errors before the list was handed over to Pakistan indicated a certain casualness in the maintenance of records relating to absconding accused in the Govt. of India and in the preparation of the list. The usual process of vetting of the list by a joint committee of the officers of the agencies and the Police was apparently not followed.
There was an unwise haste in preparing the list, handing it over to Pakistan and releasing it to the media in order to capitalize on the growing suspicions in the international community about Pakistan’s non-cooperation in counter-terrorism.
The embarrassment faced by the Government of India cannot be easily undone. The professional and diplomatic faux pas is likely to damage the reliability of our professional standards regarding investigation and documentation. It is going to take us some time to have the damage to our credibility repaired.
The episode will also enable Pakistan to reinforce its argument that Indian allegations of Pakistani support to terrorism are motivated propaganda and hence cannot be relied upon.
Three corrective steps are required to avoid a repeat of this embarrassment. Firstly, to act against the officers who have contributed to this embarrassment by their sins of commission and omission. Secondly, to revamp the process for the preparation of such documents in future to rule out errors. Thirdly, to avoid undue haste in preparing such lists and going to the media with them, in the hope of thereby embarrassing Pakistan.
If the international community has to be convinced about the correctness of our allegations against Pakistan, it must develop confidence in the reliability of our documentation and in our due diligence process in preparing such dossiers. ( 20-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
In March, our Ministry of Home Affairs had given to its Pakistani counterpart a list of 50 terrorists----Indian as well as Pakistani nationals--- who were suspected to have been involved in acts of terrorism in India. The Pakistani authorities were requested to have them arrested and handed over to India for trial.
India had been giving such lists to Pakistan ever since the Khalistani terrorists hijacked some aircraft of the Indian Airlines to Pakistan in the 1980s. Initially, the lists included mostly the names of Khalistani terrorists who were operating from Pakistan. Subsequently, the lists were expanded in the 1990's to include the names of some terrorists from Jammu & Kashmir and the absconding accused of the 1993 blasts in Mumbai, including Dawood Ibrahim and his associates.
Till about 2004, this list had a total of about 20 names. It has since expanded to 50 due to the search for the absconding accused in post-2004 jihadi acts of terrorism. Pakistan used to deny the presence of any Indian national in its territory. In respect of the Pakistani nationals figuring in the Indian lists, its response used to be that India had not been able to produce any evidence regarding their involvement in terrorism.
This exercise had been going on for nearly 30 years without Pakistan taking any action to trace those wanted by India and arresting and handing them over. Before handing them over to Pakistan, the lists used to be vetted by a joint committee consisting of officers of all agencies and the State Police. A senior officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) used to chair this committee. The representatives of the State Police were required to confirm that the lists were correct.
No errors in the preparation of these lists had occurred in the past due to the systematic vetting of the lists by all agencies sitting jointly for the purpose before handing them over to Pakistan.
This procedure does not appear to have been followed in the case of the latest list of 50 wanted terrorists. As a result, the names of at least two suspects, who had been arrested in India and hence were not absconding, found their way into the list which showed them as hiding in Pakistan.
The U.S. naval commando raid into the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2 and his death during the raid have given rise to considerable criticism in the U.S. regarding the alleged role of Pakistan in sheltering wanted terrorists. Presumably to capitalize on the growing public criticism of Pakistan for giving shelter to terrorists, the MHA apparently decided to make the latest list available to the media in order to highlight Pakistan’s non-cooperation in tracing and arresting terrorists wanted in India.
Journalists of the “Times of India” and NDTV, who scrutinized the list, found out that two of the terrorists shown in the list as hiding in Pakistan were actually in India.
This has created considerable embarrassment for the Govt. of India. Though there was no mala fide intention on the part of the MHA, its failure to detect these errors before the list was handed over to Pakistan indicated a certain casualness in the maintenance of records relating to absconding accused in the Govt. of India and in the preparation of the list. The usual process of vetting of the list by a joint committee of the officers of the agencies and the Police was apparently not followed.
There was an unwise haste in preparing the list, handing it over to Pakistan and releasing it to the media in order to capitalize on the growing suspicions in the international community about Pakistan’s non-cooperation in counter-terrorism.
The embarrassment faced by the Government of India cannot be easily undone. The professional and diplomatic faux pas is likely to damage the reliability of our professional standards regarding investigation and documentation. It is going to take us some time to have the damage to our credibility repaired.
The episode will also enable Pakistan to reinforce its argument that Indian allegations of Pakistani support to terrorism are motivated propaganda and hence cannot be relied upon.
Three corrective steps are required to avoid a repeat of this embarrassment. Firstly, to act against the officers who have contributed to this embarrassment by their sins of commission and omission. Secondly, to revamp the process for the preparation of such documents in future to rule out errors. Thirdly, to avoid undue haste in preparing such lists and going to the media with them, in the hope of thereby embarrassing Pakistan.
If the international community has to be convinced about the correctness of our allegations against Pakistan, it must develop confidence in the reliability of our documentation and in our due diligence process in preparing such dossiers. ( 20-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Category Error: Attacking Norway for Pearl Harbor
Bahukutumbi Raman, in a recent dispatch labeled “PAK ARMY & ISI: DANGEROUS MIX OF HUMILIATION & DESPERATION”, warns that Pakistan may be planning to redeem itself by orchestrating a successful strike against India, especially in the contentious Kashmir region.
No doubt, Pakistan’s citizens are seriously concerned about the ability of their government and armed forces to protect them. No doubt there has been talk on the streets of intelligence failure at best or illicit collusion with the Americans at worst.
Yet, all this follows a familiar pattern. Most military incursions into sovereign territory for any reason are done in stealth. The inevitable questions and accusations follow. Did Roosevelt know about Pearl Harbor in advance? Did Bush know about 9/11? And in her column in yesterday’s Jerusalem Post, Caroline Glick accuses Ehud Barak, Israel’s Defense Minister of failing to anticipate trouble along the country’s Syrian border on Nakba Day.
The truth is, no government can promise ironclad security to its citizens. A successful strategy, however, must involve the threat of consequences for anyone intending such a move. If Pakistan were to attack India in the wake of its so-called ‘humiliation’, such redemption would be short lived. For one thing, India had nothing to do with the bin Laden raid.
President Bush underwent a hell of tortures for his decision to attack Iraq in the wake of 9/11. His opponents constantly labeled it as “the wrong war”. In the end, rightly or wrongly, it proved to be his undoing.
My own sense of Pakistan’s leadership is that it is too mature to attack India as a direct consequence of the U.S. bin Laden raid. It has far better options: Turning its focus away from Washington to cooperating more with China is one. If India is attacked, it will not be because of anything that happened in Abbottabad.
I wish I had a similar degree of confidence in America’s foreign policy.
Monday, May 16, 2011
View from India: ALL EYES ON GILANI’S VISIT TO CHINA
by B.RAMAN
All eyes in Pakistan are on the four-day visit to China from May 17, 2011, by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. The dates of the visit were finalized some weeks ago to enable him to participate in the year-long observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It has since acquired special significance in the eyes of Pakistani analysts as it is taking place at a time when Pakistan has come under severe criticism in the U.S. for failing to detect the presence of Osama bin Laden for over five years at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where the Pakistan Military Academy is located. OBL was killed by helicopter-borne U.S. naval commandos on May 2.
2.According to Chinese sources, the documents and computer records seized by the raiding party at OBL’s residence do not appear to have yielded any evidence so far to indicate that Osama was in touch with any of the Pakistani agencies. However, the examination of the records and computer documents is still on. In the meanwhile, the Pakistani political leadership, at the urging of the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has kept the focus more on the security failure which enabled the U.S. naval commandos to raid OBL’s place without being detected by the Pakistan Air Force and the Army than on the intelligence failure that enabled OBL to live at Abbottabad for over five years.
3. The anger over the clandestine U.S. raid has been widespread in Pakistan and has led to demands for a re-examination of Pakistan ’s relations with the U.S. and of the intelligence and counter-terrorism co-operation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries. A resolution passed during an in camera session of the two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament on May 13 has also reportedly threatened to stop the flow of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port if the U.S. continued with the Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the two Waziristans and carried out any more unilateral raids by its commandos in other parts of Pakistan.
4. According to reliable Pakistani sources, Gilani is expected to raise with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao two issues which were not originally on the agenda---namely, the possibility of an increase in Chinese economic assistance to enable Pakistan to resist the U.S. pressure and Chinese military assistance for the strengthening of the air defences near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Even though Pakistan Air Force officials have attributed the non-detection of the intrusion of the U.S. choppers to the USA ’s superior stealth technology, there is also a feeling that the air defences on the Afghan border were not as good as they are on the Indian border and hence there is a need to strengthen them.
5. In the present estranged atmosphere, the U.S. is unlikely to help Pakistan in this regard. The Pakistani sources say that Gilani is expected to request the Chinese for urgent assistance in this connection. Pakistani expectations of an enhanced Chinese role to enable Pakistan to reduce its dependence on the U.S. have put the Chinese in an embarrassing position. Though they would like to oblige Pakistan to the extent possible, they would not like to do anything which could come in the way of the fresh initiatives under way for improving China ’s military-military relationship with the U.S.
6. After a gap of seven years, Gen. Chen Bingde, the Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is on a week-long visit to the U.S. from May 15. The Chinese would not like any jarring note in the military-military relations with the U.S. during Gen. Chen’s visit due to any special gesture shown by them to Pakistan. The Chinese are also keen that the U.S. Drone strikes should continue since some of the strikes in the past were directed at the training camps of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in the Waziristans, which were also training Uighur jihadis from the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province of China .
7. Since the May 2 Abbottabad raid, the Chinese have maintained a high level of oral support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue, highlighting the sacrifices allegedly made by the Pakistani security forces in the fight against jihadi terrorism. At the same time, they have avoided any dramatic gestures of a concrete nature such as increasing significantly their economic assistance to Pakistan or giving additional military assistance.
8. While they may give some concrete assistance of a limited nature during Gilani’s visit, they are likely to advise Pakistan to cool it and not to let its relations with the U.S. and its counter-terrorism co-operation with the U.S. reach a breaking point. (16-5-11)
------------------------------------------------
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
All eyes in Pakistan are on the four-day visit to China from May 17, 2011, by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani. The dates of the visit were finalized some weeks ago to enable him to participate in the year-long observance of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It has since acquired special significance in the eyes of Pakistani analysts as it is taking place at a time when Pakistan has come under severe criticism in the U.S. for failing to detect the presence of Osama bin Laden for over five years at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where the Pakistan Military Academy is located. OBL was killed by helicopter-borne U.S. naval commandos on May 2.
2.According to Chinese sources, the documents and computer records seized by the raiding party at OBL’s residence do not appear to have yielded any evidence so far to indicate that Osama was in touch with any of the Pakistani agencies. However, the examination of the records and computer documents is still on. In the meanwhile, the Pakistani political leadership, at the urging of the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has kept the focus more on the security failure which enabled the U.S. naval commandos to raid OBL’s place without being detected by the Pakistan Air Force and the Army than on the intelligence failure that enabled OBL to live at Abbottabad for over five years.
3. The anger over the clandestine U.S. raid has been widespread in Pakistan and has led to demands for a re-examination of Pakistan ’s relations with the U.S. and of the intelligence and counter-terrorism co-operation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries. A resolution passed during an in camera session of the two Houses of the Pakistan Parliament on May 13 has also reportedly threatened to stop the flow of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port if the U.S. continued with the Drone (pilotless plane) strikes in the two Waziristans and carried out any more unilateral raids by its commandos in other parts of Pakistan.
4. According to reliable Pakistani sources, Gilani is expected to raise with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao two issues which were not originally on the agenda---namely, the possibility of an increase in Chinese economic assistance to enable Pakistan to resist the U.S. pressure and Chinese military assistance for the strengthening of the air defences near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Even though Pakistan Air Force officials have attributed the non-detection of the intrusion of the U.S. choppers to the USA ’s superior stealth technology, there is also a feeling that the air defences on the Afghan border were not as good as they are on the Indian border and hence there is a need to strengthen them.
5. In the present estranged atmosphere, the U.S. is unlikely to help Pakistan in this regard. The Pakistani sources say that Gilani is expected to request the Chinese for urgent assistance in this connection. Pakistani expectations of an enhanced Chinese role to enable Pakistan to reduce its dependence on the U.S. have put the Chinese in an embarrassing position. Though they would like to oblige Pakistan to the extent possible, they would not like to do anything which could come in the way of the fresh initiatives under way for improving China ’s military-military relationship with the U.S.
6. After a gap of seven years, Gen. Chen Bingde, the Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is on a week-long visit to the U.S. from May 15. The Chinese would not like any jarring note in the military-military relations with the U.S. during Gen. Chen’s visit due to any special gesture shown by them to Pakistan. The Chinese are also keen that the U.S. Drone strikes should continue since some of the strikes in the past were directed at the training camps of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in the Waziristans, which were also training Uighur jihadis from the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province of China .
7. Since the May 2 Abbottabad raid, the Chinese have maintained a high level of oral support for Pakistan on the counter-terrorism issue, highlighting the sacrifices allegedly made by the Pakistani security forces in the fight against jihadi terrorism. At the same time, they have avoided any dramatic gestures of a concrete nature such as increasing significantly their economic assistance to Pakistan or giving additional military assistance.
8. While they may give some concrete assistance of a limited nature during Gilani’s visit, they are likely to advise Pakistan to cool it and not to let its relations with the U.S. and its counter-terrorism co-operation with the U.S. reach a breaking point. (16-5-11)
------------------------------------------------
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, May 15, 2011
View from India: PAKISTAN —TALK, TALK, HIT, HIT
by B.RAMAN
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is presently in Afghanistan on his way to Pakistan. His visit to Pakistan has been triggered off by the discovery of Osama bin Laden living for six years in a safehaven at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where he was killed by U.S. Naval commandos on May 2,2011. Tensions in the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, which had already worsened before the clandestine U.S. raid into OBL's hide-out, have been further aggravated by the defiant refusal of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to agree to any independent enquiry into the circumstances under which OBL managed to live undetected for nearly six years.
2. The U.S. suspects, with valid reasons, that OBL could not have lived that long in a garrison town without local support---- official or unofficial or both. Identifying and neutralising the sources of local support would be an important step forward in the fight against jihadi terrorism. The Pakistan Army and the ISI have dismissed suspicions of local support and are stonewalling demands----made in Pakistan as well as in the U.S.--- for an independent enquiry.
3. Kerry, known in the past as a well-wisher of Pakistan and as a strong advocate of long-term aid commitments to Pakistan, has been showing signs of skepticism after May 2. He has been quoted as saying that it was “extraordinarily hard to believe” Osama could have survived in Pakistan for so long without any knowledge.
4. This skepticism seems even stronger now, nearly two weeks after the death of OBL. He has been quoted as saying on May 14 at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had gone on a visit before proceeding to Pakistan: “Washington will consider all its options if it found out that Mullah Omar (Amir of the Afghan Taliban) was living in Pakistan. The United States government will always reserve all of its options to be able to protect our people. Other plots have been conducted and organised and planned out of Pakistan. It is really critical that we talk with the Pakistanis as friends. The United States wanted Pakistan to be a real ally in combating militants inside its borders, but serious questions remain in relations between the countries after Osama’s killing. We obviously want a Pakistan that is prepared to respect the interests of Afghanistan, and to be a real ally in our efforts to combat terrorism. We believe there are things that can be done better. And there are serious questions that need to be answered in that relationship. But we’re not trying to find a way to break the relationship apart, we’re trying to find a way to build it.”
5. Can Pakistan ever be a real ally against terrorism? That is a question that even well-wishers of Pakistan in the U.S. have started posing----not in secret, but in public. Can it be trusted to fight sincerely and genuinely against terrorism? All those, who were talking of a transformational moment in the history of Pakistan in the wake of May 2, would have been disappointed by the details of the in camera session of the Pakistan Parliament held on May 13, to discuss the OBL affair. Not the slightest sign of a feeling of shame that Osama was living unmolested in a Pakistani army garrison town for over five years. Not the slightest sign of a determination to find out the truth.
6. The fact that the world’s most dreaded terrorist was found living in an important garrison town did not seem to embarrass the Pakistani leaders and their Army and the ISI. What has embarrassed them is the fact that the U.S. managed to find that out and carry out a clandestine raid to kill him. They have decided to hold a commission of enquiry only into the security failure and not into the intelligence failure. That is, they want to find out how the U.S. carried out the raid. Nothing more.
7. Kerry has referred to other plots conducted, organized and planned out of Pakistan. Many of those plots targeted India and Indian nationals in different cities of India and in Kabul working in the Indian Embassy there. Three of those plots---all in Mumbai—involved mass fatalities---in March 1993, July 2006 and November 2008. No other city in the world has suffered so many acts of mass fatality terrorism. Pakistan has been able to carry on this policy of using terrorism as a strategic weapon because of the reluctance of the U.S. and other members of the international community to act against it.
8. The time has come for sustained action against terrorists and their hide-outs in Pakistan. If Pakistan will not act, the international community has to. Pakistanis talk of a violation of their national sovereignty----whether at Abbottabad or in respect of the Drone strikes in the two Waziristans. Of course, they constitute violations of national sovereignty---- but they are justified violations in exercise of one’s right of self-defence.
9. There are UN resolutions that describe the state-sponsorhip of terrorism as amounting to indirect aggression against the targeted country. This indirect aggression gives one the right to exercise one’s self-defence in the territory of that country if left with no other option. Till now, Pakistan managed to get away without any negative consequences because no country was prepared to take the right of self-defence into its territory.
10. Now that the U.S. has shown the way and taken the lead, it is important for India to follow its lead----not by doing a copy cat of Abbottabad, which would be messy between two neighbours--- but through other means, which would not be spectacular, but effective without involving any civilian casualties in Pakistan and without the use of Indian security or para-military forces or commandos for that purpose.
11. Options, suited to our needs, are available. We have to identify them, acquire the capability to use them and use them. As we acquire the capability, we have to educate the international community, particularly the U.S., on the serious dimensions of the problems faced by us, on our right of self-defence and on our determination to exercise that right even outside our territory if left with no other option.
12. I have endorsed strongly our Prime Minister’s initiatives for talks with Pakistan . Talks do not mean we renounce our right of self-defence. The two have to go together. I have always advocated a policy of “Talk, Talk, Hit, Hit”----keep talking so long as the talks promise results, but be prepared to hit if the talks prove counter-productive. ( 15-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
------------------------------------------
It goes without saying. Not sure how much John Kerry - a Robert Redford Red - adds to the conversation.
Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is presently in Afghanistan on his way to Pakistan. His visit to Pakistan has been triggered off by the discovery of Osama bin Laden living for six years in a safehaven at Abbottabad, the cradle of the Pakistan Army, where he was killed by U.S. Naval commandos on May 2,2011. Tensions in the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, which had already worsened before the clandestine U.S. raid into OBL's hide-out, have been further aggravated by the defiant refusal of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), to agree to any independent enquiry into the circumstances under which OBL managed to live undetected for nearly six years.
2. The U.S. suspects, with valid reasons, that OBL could not have lived that long in a garrison town without local support---- official or unofficial or both. Identifying and neutralising the sources of local support would be an important step forward in the fight against jihadi terrorism. The Pakistan Army and the ISI have dismissed suspicions of local support and are stonewalling demands----made in Pakistan as well as in the U.S.--- for an independent enquiry.
3. Kerry, known in the past as a well-wisher of Pakistan and as a strong advocate of long-term aid commitments to Pakistan, has been showing signs of skepticism after May 2. He has been quoted as saying that it was “extraordinarily hard to believe” Osama could have survived in Pakistan for so long without any knowledge.
4. This skepticism seems even stronger now, nearly two weeks after the death of OBL. He has been quoted as saying on May 14 at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, where he had gone on a visit before proceeding to Pakistan: “Washington will consider all its options if it found out that Mullah Omar (Amir of the Afghan Taliban) was living in Pakistan. The United States government will always reserve all of its options to be able to protect our people. Other plots have been conducted and organised and planned out of Pakistan. It is really critical that we talk with the Pakistanis as friends. The United States wanted Pakistan to be a real ally in combating militants inside its borders, but serious questions remain in relations between the countries after Osama’s killing. We obviously want a Pakistan that is prepared to respect the interests of Afghanistan, and to be a real ally in our efforts to combat terrorism. We believe there are things that can be done better. And there are serious questions that need to be answered in that relationship. But we’re not trying to find a way to break the relationship apart, we’re trying to find a way to build it.”
5. Can Pakistan ever be a real ally against terrorism? That is a question that even well-wishers of Pakistan in the U.S. have started posing----not in secret, but in public. Can it be trusted to fight sincerely and genuinely against terrorism? All those, who were talking of a transformational moment in the history of Pakistan in the wake of May 2, would have been disappointed by the details of the in camera session of the Pakistan Parliament held on May 13, to discuss the OBL affair. Not the slightest sign of a feeling of shame that Osama was living unmolested in a Pakistani army garrison town for over five years. Not the slightest sign of a determination to find out the truth.
6. The fact that the world’s most dreaded terrorist was found living in an important garrison town did not seem to embarrass the Pakistani leaders and their Army and the ISI. What has embarrassed them is the fact that the U.S. managed to find that out and carry out a clandestine raid to kill him. They have decided to hold a commission of enquiry only into the security failure and not into the intelligence failure. That is, they want to find out how the U.S. carried out the raid. Nothing more.
7. Kerry has referred to other plots conducted, organized and planned out of Pakistan. Many of those plots targeted India and Indian nationals in different cities of India and in Kabul working in the Indian Embassy there. Three of those plots---all in Mumbai—involved mass fatalities---in March 1993, July 2006 and November 2008. No other city in the world has suffered so many acts of mass fatality terrorism. Pakistan has been able to carry on this policy of using terrorism as a strategic weapon because of the reluctance of the U.S. and other members of the international community to act against it.
8. The time has come for sustained action against terrorists and their hide-outs in Pakistan. If Pakistan will not act, the international community has to. Pakistanis talk of a violation of their national sovereignty----whether at Abbottabad or in respect of the Drone strikes in the two Waziristans. Of course, they constitute violations of national sovereignty---- but they are justified violations in exercise of one’s right of self-defence.
9. There are UN resolutions that describe the state-sponsorhip of terrorism as amounting to indirect aggression against the targeted country. This indirect aggression gives one the right to exercise one’s self-defence in the territory of that country if left with no other option. Till now, Pakistan managed to get away without any negative consequences because no country was prepared to take the right of self-defence into its territory.
10. Now that the U.S. has shown the way and taken the lead, it is important for India to follow its lead----not by doing a copy cat of Abbottabad, which would be messy between two neighbours--- but through other means, which would not be spectacular, but effective without involving any civilian casualties in Pakistan and without the use of Indian security or para-military forces or commandos for that purpose.
11. Options, suited to our needs, are available. We have to identify them, acquire the capability to use them and use them. As we acquire the capability, we have to educate the international community, particularly the U.S., on the serious dimensions of the problems faced by us, on our right of self-defence and on our determination to exercise that right even outside our territory if left with no other option.
12. I have endorsed strongly our Prime Minister’s initiatives for talks with Pakistan . Talks do not mean we renounce our right of self-defence. The two have to go together. I have always advocated a policy of “Talk, Talk, Hit, Hit”----keep talking so long as the talks promise results, but be prepared to hit if the talks prove counter-productive. ( 15-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
------------------------------------------
It goes without saying. Not sure how much John Kerry - a Robert Redford Red - adds to the conversation.
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
View from India: CAN PAKISTAN UNILATERALLY RENOUNCE U.S. ASSISTANCE?
by B.RAMAN
Can Pakistan unilaterally renounce U.S. assistance in protest against the violation of its sovereignty by the U.S. naval commandos who raided Osama bin Laden's house at Abbottabad on the night of May 1,2011, and killed him and as a mark of its indignation over the crescendo of U.S. allegations and suspicions regarding a possible complicity of the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in facilitating OBL's stay at Abbottabad for nearly five years?
2. According to reliable sources in Pakistan, this is one of the options being considered by the political and military leadership to ward off public criticism over the perceived inaction of the political and military leaders in the face of the repeated violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by U.S. Drone (pilotless) aircraft in the tribal belt in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and at Abbottabad by the naval commandos.
3. The violation of the sovereignty at Abbottabad has been particularly galling to officers at the lower and middle levels of the Armed Forces. The reputation till now enjoyed by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in the eyes of these officers as a quiet strong man has been dented. Many of these officers no longer regard him as strong as they originally thought he was.
4.Concern over the damage suffered by the reputation of Kayani and other senior officers is behind Kayan's visits to many garrison towns after a Corps Commanders' conference in the GHQ in Rawalpindi last week to explain why the Abbottabad raid took the army by surprise.
5. According to these sources, many in the Corps Commanders conference voiced their disquiet over the failure of the civilian political leadership----particularly President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani--- to vigorously defend the Army and the ISI in the face of the attacks on their competence and professional integrity emanating from high levels of the U.S. Administration, including Mr. Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who co-ordinated the commando raid.
6. The aggressive anti-U.S. remarks of Gilani in the National Assembly on May 9 were prompted by the seething anger in the Army over the perceived hesitation in the civilian leadership in coming to the defence of the Army and the ISI. The cordiality that till now prevailed in the relationship between Prime Minister Gilani and Kayani is showing signs of being dissipated.
7. These sources feel that the danger of another coup being staged by a resentful army is remote because the Army is no longer confident of enjoying the support of the increasingly independent and fearless judiciary in legitimising any coup post-facto. At the same time, the Army's disillusionment with the leadership qualities of Zardari is showing signs of increasing and pressures are likely to increase for his exit. The salvos against Zardari and Gilani fired by Shah Mehmood Quereshi, former Foreign Minister, for their incompetent handling of the Abbottabad raid have been inspired by his Army backers.
8. These sources add that it is in this context that suggestions are being made for some dramatic action by the political and military leadership to salvage the reputation of the country. One such suggestion is for a unilateral renunciation of U.S. assistance. Whether this option will be accepted and implemented or not will depend on the kind of support China is prepared to extend should Pakistan unilaterally renounce U.S. assistance. To ascertain this will be the principal objective of Gilani's four-day visit to China from May 17. The fact that Gilani has not immediately dashed off to Beijing, but will be going only after a week would indicate a desire to avoid over-reaction in the heat of the moment. (11-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
--------------------------------------------
My comment: Pakistan can do anything it wants. It is a sovereign nation. Pakistan would not be the first to forgo U.S. money after finding out all the strings attached. The Palestinians have done so publicly; and yet, the spigot has not yet turned off. Domestically too, States are increasingly refusing Federal money for all kinds of projects.
Can Pakistan unilaterally renounce U.S. assistance in protest against the violation of its sovereignty by the U.S. naval commandos who raided Osama bin Laden's house at Abbottabad on the night of May 1,2011, and killed him and as a mark of its indignation over the crescendo of U.S. allegations and suspicions regarding a possible complicity of the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in facilitating OBL's stay at Abbottabad for nearly five years?
2. According to reliable sources in Pakistan, this is one of the options being considered by the political and military leadership to ward off public criticism over the perceived inaction of the political and military leaders in the face of the repeated violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by U.S. Drone (pilotless) aircraft in the tribal belt in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and at Abbottabad by the naval commandos.
3. The violation of the sovereignty at Abbottabad has been particularly galling to officers at the lower and middle levels of the Armed Forces. The reputation till now enjoyed by Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in the eyes of these officers as a quiet strong man has been dented. Many of these officers no longer regard him as strong as they originally thought he was.
4.Concern over the damage suffered by the reputation of Kayani and other senior officers is behind Kayan's visits to many garrison towns after a Corps Commanders' conference in the GHQ in Rawalpindi last week to explain why the Abbottabad raid took the army by surprise.
5. According to these sources, many in the Corps Commanders conference voiced their disquiet over the failure of the civilian political leadership----particularly President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani--- to vigorously defend the Army and the ISI in the face of the attacks on their competence and professional integrity emanating from high levels of the U.S. Administration, including Mr. Leon Panetta, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who co-ordinated the commando raid.
6. The aggressive anti-U.S. remarks of Gilani in the National Assembly on May 9 were prompted by the seething anger in the Army over the perceived hesitation in the civilian leadership in coming to the defence of the Army and the ISI. The cordiality that till now prevailed in the relationship between Prime Minister Gilani and Kayani is showing signs of being dissipated.
7. These sources feel that the danger of another coup being staged by a resentful army is remote because the Army is no longer confident of enjoying the support of the increasingly independent and fearless judiciary in legitimising any coup post-facto. At the same time, the Army's disillusionment with the leadership qualities of Zardari is showing signs of increasing and pressures are likely to increase for his exit. The salvos against Zardari and Gilani fired by Shah Mehmood Quereshi, former Foreign Minister, for their incompetent handling of the Abbottabad raid have been inspired by his Army backers.
8. These sources add that it is in this context that suggestions are being made for some dramatic action by the political and military leadership to salvage the reputation of the country. One such suggestion is for a unilateral renunciation of U.S. assistance. Whether this option will be accepted and implemented or not will depend on the kind of support China is prepared to extend should Pakistan unilaterally renounce U.S. assistance. To ascertain this will be the principal objective of Gilani's four-day visit to China from May 17. The fact that Gilani has not immediately dashed off to Beijing, but will be going only after a week would indicate a desire to avoid over-reaction in the heat of the moment. (11-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
--------------------------------------------
My comment: Pakistan can do anything it wants. It is a sovereign nation. Pakistan would not be the first to forgo U.S. money after finding out all the strings attached. The Palestinians have done so publicly; and yet, the spigot has not yet turned off. Domestically too, States are increasingly refusing Federal money for all kinds of projects.
Monday, May 9, 2011
View from India: PAKISTAN AFTER OBL ---QUO VADIS?
by B.RAMAN
(Written at the request of the Editor, “Hindustan Times”, New Delhi)
A wave of skepticism and anger in Pakistan has greeted the clandestine raid by U.S. naval commandoes into the place of residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, near Islamabad, on the night between May 1 and 2, which resulted in his death.
The skepticism has been over the claims made by both the U.S. and Pakistan regarding the operation itself. Large sections of the Pakistani civil society believe that a chopper-borne hit and run raid of this nature could not have been carried out by the U.S. Special Forces without the acquiescence, if not the covert collaboration, of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment.
Barring the technical break-down of a chopper which resulted in its being blown up, the entire operation lasting about two hours --- most of which was spent by the U.S. raiding team either in the Pakistani air space or territory ---- was carried out with clock-like precision. It would be very difficult to attribute the total absence of any engagement between the U.S. raiding party and the Pakistani security forces only to the remarkable capabilities of the U.S. forces alone for a clandestine operation of this nature.
There ought to have been a Pakistani role --- even if that role was only one of pre-determined inaction till the Americans had killed OBL and left ---- which ensured the success of the operation with a remarkable absence of engagement in the air or on the ground and a total lack of any collateral damage. That is what many not only in Pakistan, but also outside believe and this belief will remain strong whatever U.S. claims and explanations may say.
There have been outbursts of public anger, but surprisingly not of rage. The first Friday prayers after the raid on May 6 passed off without any serious incident of violence. The anger has been over the U.S. violation of the Pakistani sovereignty and over the suspected Pakistani collaboration with the U.S. for killing a pious Muslim, who is seen by many in the Islamic world not as a dreaded terrorist, but as a saviour and defender of Islam.
It would be difficult to assess for how long this skepticism and anger will last; but as long as it does, Pakistan will remain a vulnerable State---even more so than in the past. Its internal security situation could further deteriorate due to a possible rise in acts of suicide terrorism directed against soft as well as hard targets. At a time when the anger caused by the Pakistani commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July 2007 was showing signs of subsiding, there is a danger of its being re-kindled by the U.S. operation in Abbottabad.
Pakistan has been passing through a state of unstable equilibrium for some years now. This equilibrium could become even more unstable in the weeks and months to come as a consequence of the Abbottabad raid. How to prevent this unstable equilibrium from worsening further? That will be an important objective of the U.S. policy towards Pakistan.
Pakistan’s strategic importance for the U.S. will not diminish despite the elimination of OBL. Pakistani co-operation had served U.S. interests well in the past---whether it was in relation to the cold war or the U.S. rapprochement with China. It could serve U.S. interests in the Islamic world equally well in the future. There cannot be a stable Afghanistan without a stable Pakistan and vice versa. The U.S. interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain as strong as ever. Pakistan will continue to be a key state in the fight against Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism.
It would be a miscalculation to think that U.S. suspicions and anger over possible local support----official or unofficial or both---to OBL in Pakistan could result in major changes in the U.S. policy in the sub-continent to the detriment of Pakistan and benefit of India. While stepping up pressure on Pakistan for more sincerity and effectiveness in dealing with jihadi terrorism, the U.S. will eschew any policies or actions which could prove detrimental to its interests in Pakistan.
Instead of hoping to be able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Pakistan by exploiting the cloud over the sanctuary enjoyed by OBL, India should examine how the OBL incident could be used as one more argument for convincing Pakistan of the need to give up the path of terrorism. These are traumatizing moments for Pakistan and its people. We should avoid any signs of glee. That would be unwise.
The problems faced by us in our relations with Pakistan due to its use of terrorism will continue. We should seek a solution to this problem through our own genius and in our own way through an appropriate mix of policy incentives and disincentives. We need a stand-alone policy which will not depend on the U.S. policy towards Pakistan for its success. (9-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinert Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi)
-----------------------------------------
My comment: It would be wrong to assume that U.S. interests are solely focused on the strategic importance of Pakistan. In my view, the Osama kill was strictly a political calculation to bolster Obama's sagging popularity. We are already seeing the American long knives coming out for Pakistan. We are witnessing a broken-down old man built up into a super-hero by the American media to make him appear a worthy prize for their own Marxist super-hero to use as a weapon against any domestic opponent. Everything else - Pakistan, India, Israel, etc. - is subservient and readily expendable to the single-minded goal of getting Barack Hussein Obama reelected.
(Written at the request of the Editor, “Hindustan Times”, New Delhi)
A wave of skepticism and anger in Pakistan has greeted the clandestine raid by U.S. naval commandoes into the place of residence of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, near Islamabad, on the night between May 1 and 2, which resulted in his death.
The skepticism has been over the claims made by both the U.S. and Pakistan regarding the operation itself. Large sections of the Pakistani civil society believe that a chopper-borne hit and run raid of this nature could not have been carried out by the U.S. Special Forces without the acquiescence, if not the covert collaboration, of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment.
Barring the technical break-down of a chopper which resulted in its being blown up, the entire operation lasting about two hours --- most of which was spent by the U.S. raiding team either in the Pakistani air space or territory ---- was carried out with clock-like precision. It would be very difficult to attribute the total absence of any engagement between the U.S. raiding party and the Pakistani security forces only to the remarkable capabilities of the U.S. forces alone for a clandestine operation of this nature.
There ought to have been a Pakistani role --- even if that role was only one of pre-determined inaction till the Americans had killed OBL and left ---- which ensured the success of the operation with a remarkable absence of engagement in the air or on the ground and a total lack of any collateral damage. That is what many not only in Pakistan, but also outside believe and this belief will remain strong whatever U.S. claims and explanations may say.
There have been outbursts of public anger, but surprisingly not of rage. The first Friday prayers after the raid on May 6 passed off without any serious incident of violence. The anger has been over the U.S. violation of the Pakistani sovereignty and over the suspected Pakistani collaboration with the U.S. for killing a pious Muslim, who is seen by many in the Islamic world not as a dreaded terrorist, but as a saviour and defender of Islam.
It would be difficult to assess for how long this skepticism and anger will last; but as long as it does, Pakistan will remain a vulnerable State---even more so than in the past. Its internal security situation could further deteriorate due to a possible rise in acts of suicide terrorism directed against soft as well as hard targets. At a time when the anger caused by the Pakistani commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in July 2007 was showing signs of subsiding, there is a danger of its being re-kindled by the U.S. operation in Abbottabad.
Pakistan has been passing through a state of unstable equilibrium for some years now. This equilibrium could become even more unstable in the weeks and months to come as a consequence of the Abbottabad raid. How to prevent this unstable equilibrium from worsening further? That will be an important objective of the U.S. policy towards Pakistan.
Pakistan’s strategic importance for the U.S. will not diminish despite the elimination of OBL. Pakistani co-operation had served U.S. interests well in the past---whether it was in relation to the cold war or the U.S. rapprochement with China. It could serve U.S. interests in the Islamic world equally well in the future. There cannot be a stable Afghanistan without a stable Pakistan and vice versa. The U.S. interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will remain as strong as ever. Pakistan will continue to be a key state in the fight against Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism.
It would be a miscalculation to think that U.S. suspicions and anger over possible local support----official or unofficial or both---to OBL in Pakistan could result in major changes in the U.S. policy in the sub-continent to the detriment of Pakistan and benefit of India. While stepping up pressure on Pakistan for more sincerity and effectiveness in dealing with jihadi terrorism, the U.S. will eschew any policies or actions which could prove detrimental to its interests in Pakistan.
Instead of hoping to be able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Pakistan by exploiting the cloud over the sanctuary enjoyed by OBL, India should examine how the OBL incident could be used as one more argument for convincing Pakistan of the need to give up the path of terrorism. These are traumatizing moments for Pakistan and its people. We should avoid any signs of glee. That would be unwise.
The problems faced by us in our relations with Pakistan due to its use of terrorism will continue. We should seek a solution to this problem through our own genius and in our own way through an appropriate mix of policy incentives and disincentives. We need a stand-alone policy which will not depend on the U.S. policy towards Pakistan for its success. (9-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinert Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi)
-----------------------------------------
My comment: It would be wrong to assume that U.S. interests are solely focused on the strategic importance of Pakistan. In my view, the Osama kill was strictly a political calculation to bolster Obama's sagging popularity. We are already seeing the American long knives coming out for Pakistan. We are witnessing a broken-down old man built up into a super-hero by the American media to make him appear a worthy prize for their own Marxist super-hero to use as a weapon against any domestic opponent. Everything else - Pakistan, India, Israel, etc. - is subservient and readily expendable to the single-minded goal of getting Barack Hussein Obama reelected.
In Every Room
When you say ‘we’, I think you mean the media (elites). Their next step in this chaos of information, disinformation, self-aggrandizement and outright lying is quite obvious. Equally obvious is that we’re not buying it – you’re not buying it, and there’s no good reason to believe that anyone of any significance is either.
The job of the MSM is to turn this Osama killing (if it really was that) into a ‘prodigal son’ moment for POTUS – to have us forget whatever else he’s done. They’ll manufacture polls that say it is so; that the American people now approve of how Obama is handling his job.
The same was true of the health care debacle. Our marches on Washington; our phone calls that paralyzed Washington phone banks; our e-mails; our town hall confrontations; our special and midterm election votes – all should have been huge stories. They were not. And the impression remains that we, the people, are now on board with this, America’s first black and historic president. We are not.
The narrative between what the press would have us believe and what we know to be true is several miles wide. In a fair election contest, this chasm would be exposed. This is why I believe the next election (2012) will not be fair (if even held). The degree of fraud will depend on internal polling as we get closer; or, on the Left’s ability to put a Republican Progressive in place as to essentially effect a Hobson’s choice.
I believe that POTUS and his handlers know that this latest OBL narrative is full of holes. On one hand they are happy that it’s sucking all the oxygen out of the room. (Legislatively, Washington is once again stalled.) On the other, they are now scrambling to patch it by wagging fingers at Pakistan. There will be accusations and threats of congressional inquiry. Aid to Pakistan may or may not be withheld. Pakistan will end up so utterly smeared and discredited that nothing they can possibly say or do can absolve them. Again, that is the plan, tailored to American audiences. The world will see it differently.
POTUS does not seem to be concerned. He has likely been hoodwinked as well. He may actually see himself as the ‘bigger than life’ hero the press is making him out to be. At this point, I actually believe that we, the people, know more about virtually everything than Obama does. Should something not add up in his own mind and he is moved to raise questions, he will likely be told to relax and go out and play (a round or two on the WH putting green) – that everything will be taken care of; that his next speech has already been queued in on the teleprompter. All he has to do is read it with his customary make-believe gravitas; and, BTW, that make-up has suggested he tape his ears back a bit to make him seem less like Dumbo, the flying elephant in every room.
http://pkoelliker.blogspot.com/
Sunday, May 8, 2011
View from India: Wake Up Call
by Parvathi
It was unexpected - the killing of Osama - in the sense, we were not aware of how hot the pursuit must have been. It was said to have taken place without anyone knowing. That's hard to believe. Either way, Pakistan is absolutely miserable about its public image - America's favorite, not being told about the operation that took place just a few miles from its capital. Or worse, did Pakistan trade Osama for Afghanistan?
Strangely enough, Osama bin Laden no longer had what it takes to evoke any great emotion. In the ten years after 9/11, Al Qaeda has morphed and metastasized into a movement in which Osama appeared no longer to be central. It had become an ideology - a social movement, some say - that can no longer be easily wiped out. Who knows, maybe Osama hiding in Pakistan hated his miserable life - whatever. The most suspicious thing to me about the whole operation were the repeated reports by the press about Osama's burial at sea, complete with proper Islamic rites. Burial at sea when he was killed on land? Islamic rites - really?
Someone seems to have slipped up on their homework. Was it even Osama who was killed? Or was it all staged to boost President Obama's sagging public image? He now goes down in history as the man who avenged the carnage of 9/11. What about Osama's image as a martyr to the cause? What about the backlash for not giving him a proper Islamic burial (facing Mecca)? Who knows? Time will tell. My commitment to politics reaches only as far as the armchair remote; I see only generalities.
But the Islamic faith is an unique one. For one thing, it speaks of an abstract God who is beauty and truth. There is no image to focus on and pray to. Islam also recognizes that all men and women are equal: the beginnings of Socialism perhaps?
I had a wonderful experience of staying with a Hyderabadi Muslim family, years back, when I was in college. The men and women ate separately sitting round a low table. What fascinated me was this: their servants also ate with them - something I had never seen anywhere else before. These people were very rich upper class traders, but at the table all were one. I saw this again while watching a Bergman movie about the 19th century Swedish middle/upper-middle class. Of course here the men and women were not segregated as in the Muslim household. Neither way seemed particularly unnatural. It has always stayed with me, this wonderful feeling of community that came across.
This morning while walking on the beach I saw a beach party in progress. A big group of young people were celebrating someone's birthday with cake and candles. They were busy cutting pieces of cake, serving each other, drinking fizzy soda pops and all the rest of it. Standing at the fringe of it all and watching avidly were two beach urchins. The smaller one was asking his big brother questions: what are they eating? why the candles? how does a cake taste?
A man stood watching the two kids. He had a prayer cap and sported the traditional Muslim beard. He walked up to the group said something to them. The young people cut a couple of pieces and the man went up to the boys with the pieces of cake. The older one said he did not like cake, but the younger one just grabbed his and ate it with gusto. He looked positively ecstatic. The older one then reluctantly took the other piece. They thanked the man with the prayer cap. He said, "Allah is just, beautiful, and true." and walked away. The beach urchins turned and went their own way.
I never thought of telling the group to share their cake with the two kids.
-- from Parvathi's blog FINE LINE; reprinted by permission.
It was unexpected - the killing of Osama - in the sense, we were not aware of how hot the pursuit must have been. It was said to have taken place without anyone knowing. That's hard to believe. Either way, Pakistan is absolutely miserable about its public image - America's favorite, not being told about the operation that took place just a few miles from its capital. Or worse, did Pakistan trade Osama for Afghanistan?
Strangely enough, Osama bin Laden no longer had what it takes to evoke any great emotion. In the ten years after 9/11, Al Qaeda has morphed and metastasized into a movement in which Osama appeared no longer to be central. It had become an ideology - a social movement, some say - that can no longer be easily wiped out. Who knows, maybe Osama hiding in Pakistan hated his miserable life - whatever. The most suspicious thing to me about the whole operation were the repeated reports by the press about Osama's burial at sea, complete with proper Islamic rites. Burial at sea when he was killed on land? Islamic rites - really?
Someone seems to have slipped up on their homework. Was it even Osama who was killed? Or was it all staged to boost President Obama's sagging public image? He now goes down in history as the man who avenged the carnage of 9/11. What about Osama's image as a martyr to the cause? What about the backlash for not giving him a proper Islamic burial (facing Mecca)? Who knows? Time will tell. My commitment to politics reaches only as far as the armchair remote; I see only generalities.
But the Islamic faith is an unique one. For one thing, it speaks of an abstract God who is beauty and truth. There is no image to focus on and pray to. Islam also recognizes that all men and women are equal: the beginnings of Socialism perhaps?
I had a wonderful experience of staying with a Hyderabadi Muslim family, years back, when I was in college. The men and women ate separately sitting round a low table. What fascinated me was this: their servants also ate with them - something I had never seen anywhere else before. These people were very rich upper class traders, but at the table all were one. I saw this again while watching a Bergman movie about the 19th century Swedish middle/upper-middle class. Of course here the men and women were not segregated as in the Muslim household. Neither way seemed particularly unnatural. It has always stayed with me, this wonderful feeling of community that came across.
This morning while walking on the beach I saw a beach party in progress. A big group of young people were celebrating someone's birthday with cake and candles. They were busy cutting pieces of cake, serving each other, drinking fizzy soda pops and all the rest of it. Standing at the fringe of it all and watching avidly were two beach urchins. The smaller one was asking his big brother questions: what are they eating? why the candles? how does a cake taste?
A man stood watching the two kids. He had a prayer cap and sported the traditional Muslim beard. He walked up to the group said something to them. The young people cut a couple of pieces and the man went up to the boys with the pieces of cake. The older one said he did not like cake, but the younger one just grabbed his and ate it with gusto. He looked positively ecstatic. The older one then reluctantly took the other piece. They thanked the man with the prayer cap. He said, "Allah is just, beautiful, and true." and walked away. The beach urchins turned and went their own way.
I never thought of telling the group to share their cake with the two kids.
-- from Parvathi's blog FINE LINE; reprinted by permission.
View from India: WHO HEADED ISI WHEN OBL WAS LIVING IN ABBOTTABAD?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.717
by B.RAMAN
Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the present Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Nadeem Taj, who retired recently, and Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who is on an year’s extension after having reached the age of superannuation on March 18, 2011, have, in that order, headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the period between 2005 (month not known) and May 2, 2011, when Osama bin Laden was reportedly living near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Abbottabad, about 100 kms from Islamabad.
2. In October 2004, Gen. Pervez Musharraf appointed then Lt. Gen.Kayani as the DG of the ISI, in place of General Ehsan ul Haq, who was promoted as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kayani led the ISI during a bleak period, with insurgencies in North-West Pakistan and Balochistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation scandal, and waves of suicide attacks throughout Pakistan emanating from the northwestern tribal belt. In his final days at the ISI, he also led the talks with Benazir Bhutto for a possible power sharing deal with Musharraf. In October 2007, after three years, he was replaced at the ISI by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who was previously the head of the PMA at Abbottabad. Kayani had the unique distinction of being the first DG of the ISI to be appointed as the COAS when he succeeded Musharraf in that capacity.
3. Kayani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
4. Kayani, who had done some training courses in the U.S., is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the U.S. Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the U.S.' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
5. In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi . As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December, 2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kayani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested and court-martialled.
6. After his appointment as the DG of the ISI, he again impressed the U.S. by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt in 2005. He was immediately handed over to the U.S. without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf.
7. Even though Kayani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts spoke otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda spread its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
8. Kayani was succeeded as the DG of the ISI by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who was very close to Musharraf and at the same time known to be a virulently anti-India and anti-U.S. chief of the ISI. It was during his tenure as the head of the ISI that the agency started using David Coleman Headley and Munawuur Hussain Rana, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for carrying out terrorist strikes in India . Many suspect that the plans for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were drawn up during his tenure as the DG (of the ISI).
9. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG (of the) ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG on October 8, 2007, after his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy , with the rank of Maj. Gen.
10. Taj , once Musharraf’s Military Secretary (MS), was associated with Musharraf throughout some of the regime’s most significant events. He was flying with Musharraf from Sri Lanka on October 12, 1999 when the coup was launched and was also in Musharraf’s car during the attempts to assassinate Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December 2003. From MS, he was appointed Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and then moved on to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore before taking over as the head of the PMA at Abbottabad.
11. Taj had a very short tenure of only 10 months as the DG of the ISI because of U.S. suspicion that he was associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly as distrusted by the U.S. as was Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, who headed the ISI when Mr. Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister between 1990 and 1993. Nasir had to be sacked by Nawaz Sharif under pressure from the Clinton Administration because of his suspected links with the Afghan Mujahideen.
12. Taj was removed from the ISI by Kayani allegedly under dual pressure from the U.S. as well as China. The removal came in the wake of reports about U.S. concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in the attempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, and over leakage of information shared by the U.S. intelligence with the ISI to the Afghan Taliban. Then President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the last week of July, 2008, as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from the post of DG, ISI, Kayani took care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps, but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he did not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt. Kayani removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
13. The removal of Taj from the ISI also came in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during his week-long visit to China from September 21, 2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29, 2008. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the Khyber Pakhtunkwa province. The TTP kidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP demanded the release of over 130 Taliban members in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, said as follows: "A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said ‘the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the two young engineers freed.’ He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. ‘The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't been resolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now’, he said.”
15. The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army abruptly announced on the night of September 29, 2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), had been promoted as Lt. General and posted as the DG of the ISI in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.
16. Lt. Gen. Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj. Gen. by Musharraf in January 2003, had commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and had served as the Chief Instructor of the Command and Staff College. In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone . In October, 2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, to relieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also made by the office of the UN Secretary-General.
17. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley coming under the control of the Taliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operation against the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, who was in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January 2008 Pasha announced that his troops had defeated the TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, which had withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. In August 2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and asked Pasha to co-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two put up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps.
18. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29, 2008, as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successes and setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continual operation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is a different ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha had a colourless record. That, despite this, he was posted as the DG, ISI, showed his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secret meeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US aircraft carrier, on August 26, 2008, and not Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. It was speculated at that time that Taj did not accompany Kayani to the secret meeting with Mullen because the Americans did not want him.
19. Thus, in any enquiry regarding collusion between the ISI and OBL since 2005 which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad, the main suspicion has to be on Nadeem Taj followed by Pasha and Kayani. Another person, whose contacts with Al Qaeda would call for a detailed enquiry is Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, another officer highly trusted by Musharraf, who served as the Director of the Intelligence Bureau during this period.
20. When he was in the ISI, Shah used to be the handling officer of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. After Musharraf seized power in October 1999, he had him posted as the Home Secretary of Punjab. It was to him that Omar Sheikh, who orchestrated the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, surrendered because Omar Sheikh knew him before and was confident that Ejaz Shah would see that he was not tortured.
21. After the murder of Pearl , there were many allegations regarding Shah's role. Musharraf tried to protect him by sending him as the Ambassador to Australia or Indonesia. Both the countries reportedly refused to accept him. Musharraf then made him the DG of the IB. As the DG of the IB, he saw to it that the death sentence against Omar Sheikh for his role in the Pearl case was not executed. The courts have been repeatedly postponing hearings on the appeal filed by Omar Sheikh against the death sentence. Before her return from political exile in October 2007, Benazir Bhutto had named him as one of the officers from whom a threat to her security could arise. (8-5-2011)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
--------------------------------------------
My comment: ...and your implied question is? Who among these men knew OBL was hiding in Pakistan in plain sight? And further, who gave him up? It is clear to me that the U.S. couldn't have done it alone. Follow the money. I understand there was a bounty on OBL's head.
by B.RAMAN
Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the present Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Nadeem Taj, who retired recently, and Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who is on an year’s extension after having reached the age of superannuation on March 18, 2011, have, in that order, headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the period between 2005 (month not known) and May 2, 2011, when Osama bin Laden was reportedly living near the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Abbottabad, about 100 kms from Islamabad.
2. In October 2004, Gen. Pervez Musharraf appointed then Lt. Gen.Kayani as the DG of the ISI, in place of General Ehsan ul Haq, who was promoted as the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Kayani led the ISI during a bleak period, with insurgencies in North-West Pakistan and Balochistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear proliferation scandal, and waves of suicide attacks throughout Pakistan emanating from the northwestern tribal belt. In his final days at the ISI, he also led the talks with Benazir Bhutto for a possible power sharing deal with Musharraf. In October 2007, after three years, he was replaced at the ISI by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who was previously the head of the PMA at Abbottabad. Kayani had the unique distinction of being the first DG of the ISI to be appointed as the COAS when he succeeded Musharraf in that capacity.
3. Kayani, who joined the Pakistan Army in 1970, started his career in the Baloch Regiment as an infantryman. He did not come to public notice till Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988-90), chose him as her Deputy Military Secretary. The two maintained their personal friendship despite the ups and downs in her political career.
4. Kayani, who had done some training courses in the U.S., is believed to have a wide network of contacts in the U.S. Armed Forces, but he really attracted the attention of the U.S.' political and military leadership at the time of the Indo-Pakistan military confrontation in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. He was the Director-General, Military Operations (DGMO), at that time and the US was reportedly impressed by the cool manner in which he handled the crisis.
5. In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the X Corps at Rawalpindi . As Corps Commander, Musharraf made him responsible for co-ordinating the investigation into the two attempts to assassinate him in Rawalpindi in December, 2003. Apart from identifying some of the jihadi terrorists responsible for the attempts, Kayani also managed to establish the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the attempts and had them arrested and court-martialled.
6. After his appointment as the DG of the ISI, he again impressed the U.S. by his success in having Abu Faraj al-Libbi, an Al Qaeda operative allegedly involved in the attempts to assassinate Musharraf, arrested in the tribal belt in 2005. He was immediately handed over to the U.S. without properly interrogating him in connection with the attempts to kill Musharraf.
7. Even though Kayani was projected as a highly successful DG of the ISI, facts spoke otherwise. It was during his tenure as the DG of the ISI that the Neo Taliban staged a come-back with a bang, the Pakistan Army practically lost control over the Pashtun belt and Al Qaeda spread its sanctuaries in Pakistani territory.
8. Kayani was succeeded as the DG of the ISI by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who was very close to Musharraf and at the same time known to be a virulently anti-India and anti-U.S. chief of the ISI. It was during his tenure as the head of the ISI that the agency started using David Coleman Headley and Munawuur Hussain Rana, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), for carrying out terrorist strikes in India . Many suspect that the plans for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were drawn up during his tenure as the DG (of the ISI).
9. Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj, who is distantly related to Musharraf, served as the DG (of the) ISI for less than a year. He took over as the DG on October 8, 2007, after his promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen. Till then, he served as the Commandant, Pakistan Military Academy , with the rank of Maj. Gen.
10. Taj , once Musharraf’s Military Secretary (MS), was associated with Musharraf throughout some of the regime’s most significant events. He was flying with Musharraf from Sri Lanka on October 12, 1999 when the coup was launched and was also in Musharraf’s car during the attempts to assassinate Musharraf at Rawalpindi in December 2003. From MS, he was appointed Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and then moved on to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore before taking over as the head of the PMA at Abbottabad.
11. Taj had a very short tenure of only 10 months as the DG of the ISI because of U.S. suspicion that he was associated with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. He was reportedly as distrusted by the U.S. as was Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, who headed the ISI when Mr. Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister between 1990 and 1993. Nasir had to be sacked by Nawaz Sharif under pressure from the Clinton Administration because of his suspected links with the Afghan Mujahideen.
12. Taj was removed from the ISI by Kayani allegedly under dual pressure from the U.S. as well as China. The removal came in the wake of reports about U.S. concerns and unhappiness over the alleged role of the ISI in the attempt to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, and over leakage of information shared by the U.S. intelligence with the ISI to the Afghan Taliban. Then President Bush was reported to have taken up this matter with Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani, when he visited Washington DC in the last week of July, 2008, as well as with Zardari whom he met in the margins of the UN General Assembly session. While removing Taj from the post of DG, ISI, Kayani took care not to create a feeling of humiliation in him by posting him as the Commander of an important Corps, but as the Corps Commander at Gujranwala he did not have much to do with Afghanistan or the ongoing military operations in the tribal belt. Kayani removed him from any role in the operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
13. The removal of Taj from the ISI also came in the wake of reports of Chinese unhappiness as expressed to Kayani during his week-long visit to China from September 21, 2008, over the lack of a sense of urgency shown by the ISI in rescuing the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 29, 2008. They were working for a Chinese cellular company in the Dir area of the Khyber Pakhtunkwa province. The TTP kidnapped them while they were travelling and removed them to the Swat valley. The TTP demanded the release of over 130 Taliban members in the custody of the Pakistani security agencies in return for their release.
14. In a report on the subject carried by the 'News" of September 24, 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai, the well-informed Pakistani journalist, said as follows: "A Chinese journalist, who requested anonymity, said ‘the Pakistan Government hasn't shown any urgency in getting the two young engineers freed.’ He recalled how the issue of the two Chinese engineers kidnapped by late Pakistani Taliban commander Abdullah Mahsud's men in South Waziristan in 2004 was resolved within a few days. ‘The recent case of kidnapping of Chinese engineers hasn't been resolved even after more than three weeks. We were hoping our citizens would have been freed by now’, he said.”
15. The General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army abruptly announced on the night of September 29, 2008, that Major-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO), had been promoted as Lt. General and posted as the DG of the ISI in place of Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj.
16. Lt. Gen. Pasha, who was promoted from the rank of Brigadier to that of Maj. Gen. by Musharraf in January 2003, had commanded an infantry brigade, a mechanised infantry brigade and an infantry division and had served as the Chief Instructor of the Command and Staff College. In 2001-2002, as a Brigadier, he served as a Contingent and Sector Commander with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone . In October, 2007, Musharraf agreed to a request from Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, to relieve Pasha from the post of the DGMO so that he could be appointed as the Military Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN headquarters, in place of General Per Arne Five of Norway. An announcement on his posting in the UN headquarters was also made by the office of the UN Secretary-General.
17. But, this posting did not materialise. In view of the Swat Valley coming under the control of the Taliban-affiliated Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah, Musharraf ordered a special military operation against the TNSM and asked Pasha in his capacity as the DGMO to co-ordinate it. Pasha got Sufi Mohammad, former chief of the TNSM, who was in detention since 2002, released and sought his help in the operation. In January 2008 Pasha announced that his troops had defeated the TNSM and freed the Swat Valley from the control of the TNSM. His claim came to haunt him shortly thereafter when the TNSM, which had withdrawn into the hills, staged a come-back and re-established its control over large areas of the Swat. In August 2008, shortly after the return of Gilani from a visit to Washington DC, Gen.Kayani ordered another special operation against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda in the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and asked Pasha to co-ordinate it too. Despite repeated claims of the Army having inflicted heavy casualties on the TTP and Al Qaeda, the two put up a determined fight against the Army and the Frontier Corps.
18. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported on September 29, 2008, as follows: "Military operations against militants have been a mixed bag of successes and setbacks; however no timeframe could be given with regard to the ongoing campaigns, sources in the military said. ‘It is a continual operation. It is not going to end in 2008 and it is not going to end in 2009. Don’t be optimistic, as far as the timeframe is concerned. It is a different ground and it will take some time’, military sources said in a media briefing." Thus, as the DGMO, Pasha had a colourless record. That, despite this, he was posted as the DG, ISI, showed his closeness and loyalty to Kayani, who had taken him for his secret meeting with Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on board a US aircraft carrier, on August 26, 2008, and not Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. It was speculated at that time that Taj did not accompany Kayani to the secret meeting with Mullen because the Americans did not want him.
19. Thus, in any enquiry regarding collusion between the ISI and OBL since 2005 which enabled OBL to live in Abbottabad, the main suspicion has to be on Nadeem Taj followed by Pasha and Kayani. Another person, whose contacts with Al Qaeda would call for a detailed enquiry is Brig (retd) Ejaz Shah, another officer highly trusted by Musharraf, who served as the Director of the Intelligence Bureau during this period.
20. When he was in the ISI, Shah used to be the handling officer of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar, the Amir of the Taliban. After Musharraf seized power in October 1999, he had him posted as the Home Secretary of Punjab. It was to him that Omar Sheikh, who orchestrated the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist, surrendered because Omar Sheikh knew him before and was confident that Ejaz Shah would see that he was not tortured.
21. After the murder of Pearl , there were many allegations regarding Shah's role. Musharraf tried to protect him by sending him as the Ambassador to Australia or Indonesia. Both the countries reportedly refused to accept him. Musharraf then made him the DG of the IB. As the DG of the IB, he saw to it that the death sentence against Omar Sheikh for his role in the Pearl case was not executed. The courts have been repeatedly postponing hearings on the appeal filed by Omar Sheikh against the death sentence. Before her return from political exile in October 2007, Benazir Bhutto had named him as one of the officers from whom a threat to her security could arise. (8-5-2011)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
--------------------------------------------
My comment: ...and your implied question is? Who among these men knew OBL was hiding in Pakistan in plain sight? And further, who gave him up? It is clear to me that the U.S. couldn't have done it alone. Follow the money. I understand there was a bounty on OBL's head.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Cornerstone
For a long time now, money has trumped ideology. This is no longer the case – especially now that every dollar essentially amounts to an IOU. The ideologies of China and the Islamists share only a disgust of corrupted capitalism. Otherwise, they differ in significant ways. After the West has been defeated, these differences will come to the fore and begin to cause problems. China will have to tread pretty carefully for their alliance with Pakistan to work. In the Islamist’s eyes, they too are infidels, tolerated only because they are now brothers in arms.
Seldom discussed (except on Thursdays on The John Batchelor Show) is the pivotal role of Israel. We can pretty much predict how Israel is likely to react to an imminent existential threat for it shares our own sensibilities. Since Obama’s one vote-one man-one time election, it is rather our reaction to an attack on Israel that remains a question. I predict we will do nothing – this despite the clamor of the American people to step in to help.
Whether by its own effort or with the aid of someone else, Israel will survive. India may rise to the role of Good Samaritan. It has a strong a spiritual tradition and will inherently understand what is at stake. Do not summarily reject the spiritual dimension in all this; and don’t rule out China. They might well jump in as well, seeking to profit from the purely practical aspect of doing so. The Islamists will be defeated as they have defiled their religion. America will stand disgraced on the sidelines for the same reason.
And ‘the stone the builders rejected will once again become the cornerstone’ – Psalm 118:22.
http://pkoelliker.blogspot.com/
Is Osama Dead?
It’s now pretty clear that Pakistan has been playing a double game. It’s likely that U.S. intelligence knew this. Pakistan represents the pivot between East and West. It’s always solicited money from both sides. If you notice, the major tensions in the world right now are all happening to the west of Pakistan right now. China views Pakistan as a dam to keep the poisoned sectarian waters flowing east.
The bin Laden killing has very little to do with all this. For one thing, ‘getting bin Laden’ was only important to America – especially to Obama who needs it as a reelection prop. The confusion disseminated by the WH in the aftermath of the assassination points to something that the WH does not want the American public to know. It was orchestrated primarily to make America’s current president look good. Indications now are that Obama had help. (1) It is no longer credible that Pakistan was unaware; and (2) given Pakistan’s close ties with China, we can assume that China knew as well.
As far as both Pakistan and China are concerned, neither one particularly cared whether bin Laden lived or died. What it finally took was a request from the WH to make it happen and any incentives that the Obama administration was willing to provide.
My own pet theory is that Osama died years ago in some cave of kidney failure; that this too was known. And that the raid was staged. This would explain some of the scrambling for a narrative we are witnessing. What happens next will depend on the likely dead-cat-bounce in Obama’s poll numbers.
Pakistan and China have now got theirs as well. Obama will declare “mission accomplished” and withdraw his troops from Afghanistan, leaving the field wide open for them. Perhaps this is why we have been so reluctant to destroy the poppy fields, the only viable industry in the country. China will use Pakistan as a proxy to restore tranquility to the region. The Saudis will help. With America now completely out of the picture, the next move is Iran’s.
Is Osama dead? Probably. When did he die? Unknown.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
View from India: ABBOTTABAD RAID: A RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH TWEETS
by B.RAMAN
Chirpstory is a website that facilitates reconstruction of events through a study of Tweets relating to that event. It has put out at: http://chirpstory.com/li/1294, a compilation of "on-the-ground tweets from Abbottabad, Pakistan, compiled with very well-informed journalists/researchers' tweets." Most of the Tweets discuss the coming down of one of the helicopters participating in the raid. They discuss the following questions without being able to come to definitive answers: Was it an American or a Pakistani chopper? Did it come down due to technical reasons or was it brought down by ground fire? What was the source of the explosions heard around the same time?
2. One interesting thing that stands out is that the choppers which participated in the raid were very noisy, to the point of irritating some of the Tweeters. One of the Tweeters says: "It was too noisy to be a spy craft, or, a very poor spy craft it was." He again says: "I started noticing the helicpoter when the noise got irritating." This Tweeter was interviewed by Barkha Dutt of NDTV in her "The Buck Stops Here" show on May 3. A transcript of her interview is available at http://tinyurl.com/6kr8tyv. If the helicopters were so noisy, how is it the local security people including those in the local police stations and in the Military Academy did not hear the noise and try to make enquiries about the source of the noise?
3. There are also references in the Tweets to a black-out in the town, roads being blocked, telephones going dead and sirens being sounded. It is not clear whether these things happened during the raid or after the choppers had left with the dead body of Osama bin Laden. A taxi-driver has been quoted as saying as follows: "The army has cordoned off the crash area and is conducting door-to-door search in the surrounding." This was possibly after the raiding party had left. A sweeper has been quoted as saying as follows: "A family also died in the crash, and one of the helicopter riders got away and is now being searched for."
4. There is also a reference to a plane flying over Abbottabad, but it is not clear whether this was a Pakistani or a U.S. plane and whether it was during or after the raid.
5. During his media briefing on May 2,2011, John Brennan, Assistant to President Barack Obama on Homeland Security, was asked about the incident involving the downed chopper. He replied as follows: "Seeing that helicopter in a place and in a condition that it wasn’t supposed to be, I think that was one -- at least for me, and I know for the other people in the room -- was the concern we had that now we’re having to go to the contingency plan. And thankfully, they were as able to carry out that contingency plan as they were the initial plan." Which was that place and what was the condition in which one of the two helicopters found itself to be, forcing the Navy Seals to move from the initial plan to the contingency plan? How did the contingency plan differ from the initial plan? Brennan did not give these details; nor did the media personnel pose these questions to him.
6. Where did that chopper find itself to be which forced its being destroyed and abandoned? Was it in the court-yard of the house in which OBL was living? Or was it elsewhere? The Tweets give differing locations for the chopper crash. One of the Tweets says it was very close to the Pakistan Military Academy.
7. According to U.S. official briefings, Pakistan was not associated with the planning and execution of the operation to prevent any leaks. It was informed of the raid after the raiding party in its remaining chopper had crossed back into Afghanistan. To quote Brennan: "We didn’t contact the Pakistanis until after all of our people, all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace. At the time, the Pakistanis were reacting to an incident that they knew was taking place in Abbottabad. Therefore, they were scrambling some of their assets. Clearly, we were concerned that if the Pakistanis decided to scramble jets or whatever else, they didn’t know who were on those jets. They had no idea about who might have been on there, whether it be U.S. or somebody else. So we were watching and making sure that our people and our aircraft were able to get out of Pakistani airspace. And thankfully, there was no engagement with Pakistani forces. This operation was designed to minimize the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there was no other individuals who were killed aside from those on the compound."
8. The raiding party itself went in two choppers one of which found itself in a place where it was not supposed to be and hence had to be destroyed. The other chopper brought the raiding party back to Afghanistan with OBL's body and those captured. Brennan said that Pakistan was not informed till "all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace" This would indicate there were other U.S. planes and/or choppers in the Pakistani air space during the raid.
9. One U.S. claim can be accepted without any problem----that it was purely a U.S. operation with no involvement of Pakistan in the planning and execution. The problem arises with reference to the U.S. claim that Pakistan was informed only after the raiding partry had re-entered the Afghan airspace. The entire operation in Abbottabad itself lasted at least an hour: 40 minutes of the fire-fight and at least 20 minutes for the time taken by the choppers to manoeuvre themselves. During this period there was the heavy noise made by the choppers as they came down near OBL's house, the noise made by the crashing chopper and the noise of the fire-fight. How come during this entire period none of the security personnel posted in Abbottabad for the protection of the PMA and the senior Army officers living in the town and in the campus of the PMA noticed that there was something wrong and alerted the local units of the armed forces, para-military forces and the police.?
10. Only two explanations are possible: either there was total security incompetence at Abbottabad or the local security had been told by the Pakistani military leadership not to worry and keep quiet. If the second explanation is correct, the Pakistanis must have known of the impending raid before it took place. ( 5-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
------------------------------------------------
My comment: Very little is being made of the crashed helicopter here in America. It does not even seem a part of the story. Could be that the helicopter was deliberately crashed to create a diversion and give Pakistan a reason to close off roads? Also, if the crashed helicopter is mentioned at all, it's mentioned within the context of it having been one of our most advanced models and will likely be going to China for them to examine. The Tweets seem to indicate that it was junk.
Chirpstory is a website that facilitates reconstruction of events through a study of Tweets relating to that event. It has put out at: http://chirpstory.com/li/1294, a compilation of "on-the-ground tweets from Abbottabad, Pakistan, compiled with very well-informed journalists/researchers' tweets." Most of the Tweets discuss the coming down of one of the helicopters participating in the raid. They discuss the following questions without being able to come to definitive answers: Was it an American or a Pakistani chopper? Did it come down due to technical reasons or was it brought down by ground fire? What was the source of the explosions heard around the same time?
2. One interesting thing that stands out is that the choppers which participated in the raid were very noisy, to the point of irritating some of the Tweeters. One of the Tweeters says: "It was too noisy to be a spy craft, or, a very poor spy craft it was." He again says: "I started noticing the helicpoter when the noise got irritating." This Tweeter was interviewed by Barkha Dutt of NDTV in her "The Buck Stops Here" show on May 3. A transcript of her interview is available at http://tinyurl.com/6kr8tyv. If the helicopters were so noisy, how is it the local security people including those in the local police stations and in the Military Academy did not hear the noise and try to make enquiries about the source of the noise?
3. There are also references in the Tweets to a black-out in the town, roads being blocked, telephones going dead and sirens being sounded. It is not clear whether these things happened during the raid or after the choppers had left with the dead body of Osama bin Laden. A taxi-driver has been quoted as saying as follows: "The army has cordoned off the crash area and is conducting door-to-door search in the surrounding." This was possibly after the raiding party had left. A sweeper has been quoted as saying as follows: "A family also died in the crash, and one of the helicopter riders got away and is now being searched for."
4. There is also a reference to a plane flying over Abbottabad, but it is not clear whether this was a Pakistani or a U.S. plane and whether it was during or after the raid.
5. During his media briefing on May 2,2011, John Brennan, Assistant to President Barack Obama on Homeland Security, was asked about the incident involving the downed chopper. He replied as follows: "Seeing that helicopter in a place and in a condition that it wasn’t supposed to be, I think that was one -- at least for me, and I know for the other people in the room -- was the concern we had that now we’re having to go to the contingency plan. And thankfully, they were as able to carry out that contingency plan as they were the initial plan." Which was that place and what was the condition in which one of the two helicopters found itself to be, forcing the Navy Seals to move from the initial plan to the contingency plan? How did the contingency plan differ from the initial plan? Brennan did not give these details; nor did the media personnel pose these questions to him.
6. Where did that chopper find itself to be which forced its being destroyed and abandoned? Was it in the court-yard of the house in which OBL was living? Or was it elsewhere? The Tweets give differing locations for the chopper crash. One of the Tweets says it was very close to the Pakistan Military Academy.
7. According to U.S. official briefings, Pakistan was not associated with the planning and execution of the operation to prevent any leaks. It was informed of the raid after the raiding party in its remaining chopper had crossed back into Afghanistan. To quote Brennan: "We didn’t contact the Pakistanis until after all of our people, all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace. At the time, the Pakistanis were reacting to an incident that they knew was taking place in Abbottabad. Therefore, they were scrambling some of their assets. Clearly, we were concerned that if the Pakistanis decided to scramble jets or whatever else, they didn’t know who were on those jets. They had no idea about who might have been on there, whether it be U.S. or somebody else. So we were watching and making sure that our people and our aircraft were able to get out of Pakistani airspace. And thankfully, there was no engagement with Pakistani forces. This operation was designed to minimize the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there was no other individuals who were killed aside from those on the compound."
8. The raiding party itself went in two choppers one of which found itself in a place where it was not supposed to be and hence had to be destroyed. The other chopper brought the raiding party back to Afghanistan with OBL's body and those captured. Brennan said that Pakistan was not informed till "all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace" This would indicate there were other U.S. planes and/or choppers in the Pakistani air space during the raid.
9. One U.S. claim can be accepted without any problem----that it was purely a U.S. operation with no involvement of Pakistan in the planning and execution. The problem arises with reference to the U.S. claim that Pakistan was informed only after the raiding partry had re-entered the Afghan airspace. The entire operation in Abbottabad itself lasted at least an hour: 40 minutes of the fire-fight and at least 20 minutes for the time taken by the choppers to manoeuvre themselves. During this period there was the heavy noise made by the choppers as they came down near OBL's house, the noise made by the crashing chopper and the noise of the fire-fight. How come during this entire period none of the security personnel posted in Abbottabad for the protection of the PMA and the senior Army officers living in the town and in the campus of the PMA noticed that there was something wrong and alerted the local units of the armed forces, para-military forces and the police.?
10. Only two explanations are possible: either there was total security incompetence at Abbottabad or the local security had been told by the Pakistani military leadership not to worry and keep quiet. If the second explanation is correct, the Pakistanis must have known of the impending raid before it took place. ( 5-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
------------------------------------------------
My comment: Very little is being made of the crashed helicopter here in America. It does not even seem a part of the story. Could be that the helicopter was deliberately crashed to create a diversion and give Pakistan a reason to close off roads? Also, if the crashed helicopter is mentioned at all, it's mentioned within the context of it having been one of our most advanced models and will likely be going to China for them to examine. The Tweets seem to indicate that it was junk.
Stinks To High Heaven
‘Purposeful’? Please! The (UK) Telegraph reports that Barack Obama is set to release up to 2000 photographs of prisoner abuse by U.S. military personnel. This comes at a time when he decides not to release pictures of the dead Osama bin Laden. While it is likely that both issues are still in flux – as the WH has been known to waver – the fact that this is even being discussed at this time is nothing short of a slap at America.
There is your reason for why former President Bush will not be seen with Obama (at Ground Zero or anywhere. I would even go so far as to suggest that everyone stay away from today’s wreath laying.) I have often said that the primary aim of this post-American administration is to sow chaos. We have chaos in our financial markets; we have chaos in our energy sector; we have chaos in our government… Everywhere you look there is chaos and no attempt is being made to steer away from what appears to be total collapse.
This incident involving the release of photographs shows as clearly as anything I have seen what Obama is up to overall. It can no longer be regarded as isolated happenstance; a mistake; second thoughts; inexperience – what have you. The pattern is unmistakable.
There is now an attempt to pull Pakistan into it. It is said, they couldn’t possibly NOT have been involved. Pakistan could actually be cleaner than we think. Maybe Pakistan knew that bin Laden was already dead. They were simply paid not to interfere with Obama’s Hollywood photo shoot. I’ve seen the pictures purported to be of the dead bin Laden. I see a dead man. I don’t necessarily see bin Laden. For all I know, it could all be a hoax. The argument against it, of course, is that too many people had to have been involved. Somebody would be bound to talk.
It’s not that there haven’t been hoaxes before. Do I have to list them? ‘Global warming’, for one. Many also suspect the financial meltdown just before the 2008 election. What about the current American presidency itself? You would have to agree that the way in which Obama was elected was highly unusual. (No background checks; no checks at all.) And you’ve got to ask yourself: Would America really have elected a Marxist, had they known? Come to think of it, the last thing I saw on television that was real was the World Trade Towers coming down. Since then, it’s all been pap, and us trying so hard to believe that we haven’t been played for fools.
BTW, I continue to be astounded by Larry Kudlow’s continued optimism. I see nothing on the horizon that would justify this. I agree that if a proper election were held in 2012, our skies would brighten. At this point the leg of a stool would be an improvement over the current WH occupant. And yet, every day we are told that Obama could and will win reelection. I, for one, am wondering if we’ll even make it that far.
http://pkoelliker.blogspot.com/
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
View from India: DEATH OF A JIHADI FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER
by B.RAMAN
(Written at the request of the Editor of the “Economic Times”, New Delhi)
Osama bin Laden (OBL), the head of Al Qaeda, was killed by the U.S. Special Forces during a past midnight chopper-borne raid on his hide-out at Abbotabad, a garrison town, about 100 kms from Islamabad, on May 1. He influenced thousands of young Muslims, who grew to adulthood in the 1980s and the 1990s, to take to jihadi terrorism as a weapon of defiance. He wanted them to use this weapon to correct what he looked upon as the historic injustices done to the Ummah by the non-Islamic world.
Among such instances of historic injustices to the Muslims, he cited the Jewish occupation of Palestine and the occupation of lands, which, according to him, had historically belonged to the Muslims by non-Islamic forces. He also wanted the Muslims to take to arms against ideological influences that tended to corrupt Islam.
He initially fought against the corrupting influence of the Marxist ideology in Afghanistan against the Soviet and Afghan troops in the 1980s. He saw nothing wrong in accepting the assistance of Western ideological forces for countering Marxism and to force it to quit Afghanistan.
He might not have acquired the iconic image which he developed subsequently but for the use of him by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIAS) and the agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which projected him as a jihadi fighter par excellence in order to use him for mobilising Muslim youth of the Arab world for the jihad against the Soviet troops and the Marxist ideology.
With the assistance of these agencies, he forced the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan and helped to bring Afghanistan under the control of medieval Islamic forces in the form of the Taliban. His medieval version of Islam, which is condemned today by the U.S., was encouraged by the U.S. in the 1980s to use it as a strategic weapon against Marxism .
Having tasted success in Afghanistan, he and his force of Arab youth, trained and armed with the help of these agencies in secret camps in Pakistan turned against their Western benefactors and mentors and transformed their jihad against Marxism into a new jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish people in the 1990s. The icon of the 1980s, toasted by the U.S. because of his success against the Marxists, became the dreaded Frankenstein’s monster of the 1990s and thereafter.
This jihadi Frankenstein’s monster, jointly created by the agencies of the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, became the world’s most dreaded terrorist who spread death and destruction across the world through his Al Qaeda and International Islamic Front (IIC) starting from 1996. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the U.S. Homeland made the U.S. realize that the reach of this monster of its own creation had extended up to the U.S.
The slaying of this monster became the driving force of the so-called war against international terrorism. It has taken nearly 10 years and an expenditure of billions of dollars to slay this monster. At the end, the death of this monster came at the place where it was born, namely, in Pakistan. After 10 years of search the monster was traced .
The monster was found hiding in the place where the Pakistan Army was born and where its new officer-recruits are trained every year. Abbotabad is the cradle of the Pakistan Army and in that cradle was found the monster. There were indicators of a cosy relationahip between the monster and one of its original creators----the Pakistani Army and intelligence.
The death of the jihadi Frankenstein’s monster in the cradle of the Pakistan Army has thrown the spotlight even more intensely than till now on another Frankenstein’s monster --- namely, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.
Since the 1980s, the ISI was was pampered, fed and fattened by the U.S. along with the Pakistan Army. The U.S., which closed its eyes to the pernicious role played by this State Frankenstein’s monster in sponsoring terrorism of various kinds against India, Afghanistan and other countries, is confused and does not know how to act against this State Frankenstein’s monster after having killed the non-State monster.
The end of OBL will not be the end of international jihadi terrorism. The non-state head of international jihadi terrorism may be dead, but the State of Pakistan, which continues to use this terrorism, lives in a denial mode. Neither the State of Pakistan nor its civil society is prepared to admit that Al Qaeda and its surviving leaders have managed to escape arrest, prosecution or death so far, because of the support extended to them by the State of Pakistan. The same is the case with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other jihadi affiliates of Al Qaeda.
Unless the U.S. and other members of the international community are prepared to draw the right lessons from the discovery that OBL had been living and surviving in an important garrison town of Pakistan and force the State of Pakistan to stop using terrorism as a weapon of the State, OBL’s death may not mark the beginning of the end of international jihadi terrorism.
OBL may be dead but jihadi terrorism in some form or the other will survive so long as it enjoys the support of the State of Pakistan.( 3-5-2011)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India)
(Written at the request of the Editor of the “Economic Times”, New Delhi)
Osama bin Laden (OBL), the head of Al Qaeda, was killed by the U.S. Special Forces during a past midnight chopper-borne raid on his hide-out at Abbotabad, a garrison town, about 100 kms from Islamabad, on May 1. He influenced thousands of young Muslims, who grew to adulthood in the 1980s and the 1990s, to take to jihadi terrorism as a weapon of defiance. He wanted them to use this weapon to correct what he looked upon as the historic injustices done to the Ummah by the non-Islamic world.
Among such instances of historic injustices to the Muslims, he cited the Jewish occupation of Palestine and the occupation of lands, which, according to him, had historically belonged to the Muslims by non-Islamic forces. He also wanted the Muslims to take to arms against ideological influences that tended to corrupt Islam.
He initially fought against the corrupting influence of the Marxist ideology in Afghanistan against the Soviet and Afghan troops in the 1980s. He saw nothing wrong in accepting the assistance of Western ideological forces for countering Marxism and to force it to quit Afghanistan.
He might not have acquired the iconic image which he developed subsequently but for the use of him by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIAS) and the agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which projected him as a jihadi fighter par excellence in order to use him for mobilising Muslim youth of the Arab world for the jihad against the Soviet troops and the Marxist ideology.
With the assistance of these agencies, he forced the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan and helped to bring Afghanistan under the control of medieval Islamic forces in the form of the Taliban. His medieval version of Islam, which is condemned today by the U.S., was encouraged by the U.S. in the 1980s to use it as a strategic weapon against Marxism .
Having tasted success in Afghanistan, he and his force of Arab youth, trained and armed with the help of these agencies in secret camps in Pakistan turned against their Western benefactors and mentors and transformed their jihad against Marxism into a new jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish people in the 1990s. The icon of the 1980s, toasted by the U.S. because of his success against the Marxists, became the dreaded Frankenstein’s monster of the 1990s and thereafter.
This jihadi Frankenstein’s monster, jointly created by the agencies of the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, became the world’s most dreaded terrorist who spread death and destruction across the world through his Al Qaeda and International Islamic Front (IIC) starting from 1996. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the U.S. Homeland made the U.S. realize that the reach of this monster of its own creation had extended up to the U.S.
The slaying of this monster became the driving force of the so-called war against international terrorism. It has taken nearly 10 years and an expenditure of billions of dollars to slay this monster. At the end, the death of this monster came at the place where it was born, namely, in Pakistan. After 10 years of search the monster was traced .
The monster was found hiding in the place where the Pakistan Army was born and where its new officer-recruits are trained every year. Abbotabad is the cradle of the Pakistan Army and in that cradle was found the monster. There were indicators of a cosy relationahip between the monster and one of its original creators----the Pakistani Army and intelligence.
The death of the jihadi Frankenstein’s monster in the cradle of the Pakistan Army has thrown the spotlight even more intensely than till now on another Frankenstein’s monster --- namely, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.
Since the 1980s, the ISI was was pampered, fed and fattened by the U.S. along with the Pakistan Army. The U.S., which closed its eyes to the pernicious role played by this State Frankenstein’s monster in sponsoring terrorism of various kinds against India, Afghanistan and other countries, is confused and does not know how to act against this State Frankenstein’s monster after having killed the non-State monster.
The end of OBL will not be the end of international jihadi terrorism. The non-state head of international jihadi terrorism may be dead, but the State of Pakistan, which continues to use this terrorism, lives in a denial mode. Neither the State of Pakistan nor its civil society is prepared to admit that Al Qaeda and its surviving leaders have managed to escape arrest, prosecution or death so far, because of the support extended to them by the State of Pakistan. The same is the case with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and other jihadi affiliates of Al Qaeda.
Unless the U.S. and other members of the international community are prepared to draw the right lessons from the discovery that OBL had been living and surviving in an important garrison town of Pakistan and force the State of Pakistan to stop using terrorism as a weapon of the State, OBL’s death may not mark the beginning of the end of international jihadi terrorism.
OBL may be dead but jihadi terrorism in some form or the other will survive so long as it enjoys the support of the State of Pakistan.( 3-5-2011)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India)
Monday, May 2, 2011
Clouds Gathering
Things are starting to come into focus. Let’s stipulate for a moment that all we’ve been hearing is true; that Obama is actually native born, and that he succeeded in finding and killing Osama; that Osama hasn’t really been dead for years and that it’s not only just now that Obama is taking credit for his corpse. Let’s even say that Pakistan was involved in the ruse (which now seems likely) and that the whole thing hinged on a deal by which Obama get’s Osama and Pakistan gets Afghanistan. How does this help Obama?
Well, for one thing, judging from the reaction of both the left and right media, Obama is counting on his poll numbers to go up – and stay up. He’ll be able to say to the American public that the war in Afghanistan is now over and we can withdraw our troops. Americans would view this as welcome news and give full credit to our heroic and victorious president - and reelect him to a second term.
The problem is that the world has changed since 9/11. What has changed is that the Left and the Islamists are now united and are working in consort for a common goal. The movement that started with bin Laden is no longer strictly Arab based. It is based on the far broader idea of ending western capitalism. There are strong indications that Obama is quite on board with that. This would make POTUS our very own home-grown “Jihad Johnny” (Walker, a.k.a. ‘The American Taliban’).
The fly in the ointment is the Islamic inviolable desire to push Israel into the sea and that this must occur before anything else happens. POTUS has already shown himself as being no particular friend of Israel. Yet, he still depends heavily on (liberal) Jewish support. This would require him to play a double game. He must seem to please both the Arabs as well as the Jews.
The best way for him to proceed would be to work against Israel in a stealth manner. We note that every maneuver of his is designed to weaken Israel and strengthen her adversaries. It is my belief that he intends for Israel to fall while keeping his own hands clean. I do not believe this strategy will work. When push comes to shove, Israel will either successfully defend herself or receive help from an unexpected source. (China?)
At this point, the Left-Islamic coalition will come off the rails and the game will be exposed. The West will turn on a dime and fight back. None of this will be pretty to watch; but in the end all will turn out alright. The cleanup will be tremendous though. Economies will be in ruins and there will be plenty of blood. Islamists will meet up with their sainted martyrdom and the Left will be pursued to the ends of the earth.
We are reminded of the start of the Second World War. It’s difficult to imagine such a war without the U.S. being on the side of the good guys. But Germany turned out alright in the end, after everything was said and done. It’s just a shame that we will have to go through the whole mess all over again.
You might want to re-read my article entitled “The Tables Are Turning”, posted June 4th, 2010 for some background re elitism and how Israel fits into the overall picture.
http://pkoelliker.blogspot.com/
View from India: OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH
by B.RAMAN (questions and answers)
Question: Was the operation that was carried out by the U.S. Special Forces against Osama bin Laden resulting in his death at Abbotabad in Pakistan on the night of May 1 an exclusive U.S. operation or was it a joint U.S.-Pak operation?
Answer: Till now the indications are that it was an exclusive U.S. operation. Since it involved the ingress of the U.S. specal forces into Pakistani territory by air in helicopters, it was likely that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was informed before the helicopters with the special forces took off from Afghanistan for the raid even though U.S. officials have reportedly been asserting that Pakistan was informed only after the helicopters had taken off at the end of the operation. When Bill Clinton's Administration launched the Cruise missile strikes on the training camps of Al Qaeda in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan in 1998 they followed a similar procedure. Gen Anthony Zinni, the then Commanding Officer of the U.S. Central Command, flew to Islamabad from a U.S. naval ship and informed Gen. Jehangir Karamat, the then COAS, about the impending raid. The U.S. did so to make sure that Pakistan did not interpret that the missile had been launched by India and order a missile strike against India. A similar precaution was likely to have been taken this time too. Moreover, Abbotabad, an important military garrison town, has high air defence cover. It was important to prevent a messy air defence action by Pakistan against the U.S. helicopters if its radars had detected their approach. The entire operation lasted a little over two hours. During this period, one of the helicopters crashed. It was blown up and destroyed by the special forces. A newsletter disseminated by a retired U.S. naval officer says: "Source says actual crash sight was on Kakul Road, Abbottabod, Pakistan just down from the Pakistan Military Academy exercise grounds. See image for road, which was reportedly blocked off by local security after the incident. Folks in the city mentioned on Twitter at the time that the action was very, very close to the PMA." This would indicate that during the entire operation on the ground, which lasted over 90 minutes if one excludes the time taken by the choppers for their to and fro journey, the Pakistani security forces did not intervene and try to find out what was going on. The local police blocked the stretch of the road where the helicopter had crashed to prevent onlookers rushing there till the Americans had destroyed the chopper. All this clearly shows that the Pakistanis must have had advance knowledge of the operation and had instructions from above not to intervene.
Q: Has the U.S. undertaken similar operations deep inside Pakistan before?
A. Yes thrice before. Twice in 2002 in Faislabad and Karachi to capture Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh respectively and once in 2003 in Rawalpindi to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM).
Q: How did those operations differ from the latest operation to kill OBL?
A: The three previous operations were joint U.S.-Pakistan operations with the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) playing the leadership role. The raids were organised on the basis of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by the U.S. agencies due to the careless use of mobile telephones by the three arrested persons. The latest operation against OBL seems to have been an exclusive U.S. operation with the prior knowledge of Pakistan, but with no Pakistani role in its planning and execution. Since OBL was not using any communication equipment such as mobile telephone, Internet etc in his hide-out, no Technical Intelligence would have been possible. It seems to have been mounted purely on the basis of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The success of the operation speaks very highly of the improvement in the HUMINT capability of the U.S. agencies.
Q: Wherefrom could the HUMINT have come?
A: Abbotabad is a Hazara town. The Hazaras are strongly against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban because of the massacre of the Hazaras, many of whom are Shias, in East Afghanistan when the Taliban was in power in Kabul. It is likely that the local Hazara community might have played a role in assisting the U.S. in its OBL hunt. In fact, it is surprising that OBL took shelter in that town despite the strong presence of the Hazaras there. No explanation for this has been forthcoming so far.
Q: Is it possible that the ISI might have played a role in the collection of the HUMINT?
A. Difficult to answer this question.
Q: How come the huge mansion in which OBL was reportedly living did not attract suspicion as it was being constructed in 2005?
A: Difficult to explain it unless the mansion had been constructed by a retired senior General of the Army as his farm house and then given on rent to OBL's family with or without the knowledge that it was the family of OBL.
Q: For how long OBL must have been living in the mansion?
A: According to U.S. media reports, the house had been under watch by the U.S. since Auguat last year. Obama gave the order for the operation on April 29 on the receipt of precise information that OBL was inside the mansion. This would give rise to the possibility that Osama's family had been living in the mansion at least since last August, that OBL had been visiting them off and on and that Obama gave the order for the operation after receiving information in the last week of April that OBL had come to visit his family. This is what happened in the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who was killed in a Drone strike. His wife and children were living with her father. Baitullah was visiting them off and on. The Americans had reportedly managed to find out the details of the car of Baitullah. One day they received information that Baitullah's car was parked outside his in-laws' house. They directed a missile strike at it. Baitullah was among those killed. In the case of OBL, they did not make a missile strike. Instead, they sent a special forces team to kill OBL in a fire-fight.
Q: Was there an official Pakistani complicity in OBL's living in Abbotabad?
A: The evidence till now is circumstantial and not direct. Why did OBL choose to live in Abbotabad despite the presence of a large number of Hazaras there? The only possible answer is because he felt confident his security would be assured there. He could have got this confidence only if had the support of some sections of the local security agencies and/or the police and also of some local elements of the non-Hazara segment of the population. This is more speculative than of any evidentiary value. The direct evidence could come from the interrogation of those arrested alive from the mansion by the U.S. special forces.
Q: What impact this will have on U.S. relations with Pakistan?
A: The U.S. already has considerable suspicion that Pakistan has been playing a double game by dragging its feet on the issue of action against Al Qaeda. This suspicion will now be further strengthened. The smoking gun in the form of OBL's dead body has clearly established that OBL was living in an urban town of Pakistan. Was he living there with the knowledge or collusion of the Pakistani security agencies? There is no smoking gun on this yet. Unless that becoms available, the U.S. would find it difficult to act against the State of Pakistan. The relations will continue as before with ups and downs and with alternating praise for action taken and reprimands for actions not taken.
Q: Will the death of OBL be the end of Al Qaeda?
A: No.Since 9/11, Al Qaeda is already a weakened organisation due to repeated Drone strikes on its hide-outs and capture of some of its leaders on the ground in Pakistan. This process of weakening that has been there since 2002 could acquire pace and strength as a result of the death of OBL. Despite this, Al Qaeda, by itself, will remain a potent force for some years to come until it suffers more attrition.
Q: Will it have any impact on Obama's plans to start thinning out troops from Afghanistan? Will it enable or tempt Obama to accelerate the process?
A: No. Obama's decisions relating to Afghanistan will depend on the evolution of the ground situation in Afghanistan and on the proved ability of the Afghan National Army to withstand pressure from the Taliban.
Q: What are the dangers of reprisal attacks by Al Qaeda and its affiliates?
A: High in the Af-Pak region. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda affiliates like the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) will presume that the Pakistani security forces must have co-operated with the U.S. Acts of suicide terrorism against the Pakistani security forces and U.S. nationals and interests in Pakistan could increase.
High against U.S. nationals and interests in other countries.
Medium to low in the U.S. homeland. ( 2-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Question: Was the operation that was carried out by the U.S. Special Forces against Osama bin Laden resulting in his death at Abbotabad in Pakistan on the night of May 1 an exclusive U.S. operation or was it a joint U.S.-Pak operation?
Answer: Till now the indications are that it was an exclusive U.S. operation. Since it involved the ingress of the U.S. specal forces into Pakistani territory by air in helicopters, it was likely that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was informed before the helicopters with the special forces took off from Afghanistan for the raid even though U.S. officials have reportedly been asserting that Pakistan was informed only after the helicopters had taken off at the end of the operation. When Bill Clinton's Administration launched the Cruise missile strikes on the training camps of Al Qaeda in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan in 1998 they followed a similar procedure. Gen Anthony Zinni, the then Commanding Officer of the U.S. Central Command, flew to Islamabad from a U.S. naval ship and informed Gen. Jehangir Karamat, the then COAS, about the impending raid. The U.S. did so to make sure that Pakistan did not interpret that the missile had been launched by India and order a missile strike against India. A similar precaution was likely to have been taken this time too. Moreover, Abbotabad, an important military garrison town, has high air defence cover. It was important to prevent a messy air defence action by Pakistan against the U.S. helicopters if its radars had detected their approach. The entire operation lasted a little over two hours. During this period, one of the helicopters crashed. It was blown up and destroyed by the special forces. A newsletter disseminated by a retired U.S. naval officer says: "Source says actual crash sight was on Kakul Road, Abbottabod, Pakistan just down from the Pakistan Military Academy exercise grounds. See image for road, which was reportedly blocked off by local security after the incident. Folks in the city mentioned on Twitter at the time that the action was very, very close to the PMA." This would indicate that during the entire operation on the ground, which lasted over 90 minutes if one excludes the time taken by the choppers for their to and fro journey, the Pakistani security forces did not intervene and try to find out what was going on. The local police blocked the stretch of the road where the helicopter had crashed to prevent onlookers rushing there till the Americans had destroyed the chopper. All this clearly shows that the Pakistanis must have had advance knowledge of the operation and had instructions from above not to intervene.
Q: Has the U.S. undertaken similar operations deep inside Pakistan before?
A. Yes thrice before. Twice in 2002 in Faislabad and Karachi to capture Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh respectively and once in 2003 in Rawalpindi to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM).
Q: How did those operations differ from the latest operation to kill OBL?
A: The three previous operations were joint U.S.-Pakistan operations with the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) playing the leadership role. The raids were organised on the basis of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by the U.S. agencies due to the careless use of mobile telephones by the three arrested persons. The latest operation against OBL seems to have been an exclusive U.S. operation with the prior knowledge of Pakistan, but with no Pakistani role in its planning and execution. Since OBL was not using any communication equipment such as mobile telephone, Internet etc in his hide-out, no Technical Intelligence would have been possible. It seems to have been mounted purely on the basis of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The success of the operation speaks very highly of the improvement in the HUMINT capability of the U.S. agencies.
Q: Wherefrom could the HUMINT have come?
A: Abbotabad is a Hazara town. The Hazaras are strongly against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban because of the massacre of the Hazaras, many of whom are Shias, in East Afghanistan when the Taliban was in power in Kabul. It is likely that the local Hazara community might have played a role in assisting the U.S. in its OBL hunt. In fact, it is surprising that OBL took shelter in that town despite the strong presence of the Hazaras there. No explanation for this has been forthcoming so far.
Q: Is it possible that the ISI might have played a role in the collection of the HUMINT?
A. Difficult to answer this question.
Q: How come the huge mansion in which OBL was reportedly living did not attract suspicion as it was being constructed in 2005?
A: Difficult to explain it unless the mansion had been constructed by a retired senior General of the Army as his farm house and then given on rent to OBL's family with or without the knowledge that it was the family of OBL.
Q: For how long OBL must have been living in the mansion?
A: According to U.S. media reports, the house had been under watch by the U.S. since Auguat last year. Obama gave the order for the operation on April 29 on the receipt of precise information that OBL was inside the mansion. This would give rise to the possibility that Osama's family had been living in the mansion at least since last August, that OBL had been visiting them off and on and that Obama gave the order for the operation after receiving information in the last week of April that OBL had come to visit his family. This is what happened in the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who was killed in a Drone strike. His wife and children were living with her father. Baitullah was visiting them off and on. The Americans had reportedly managed to find out the details of the car of Baitullah. One day they received information that Baitullah's car was parked outside his in-laws' house. They directed a missile strike at it. Baitullah was among those killed. In the case of OBL, they did not make a missile strike. Instead, they sent a special forces team to kill OBL in a fire-fight.
Q: Was there an official Pakistani complicity in OBL's living in Abbotabad?
A: The evidence till now is circumstantial and not direct. Why did OBL choose to live in Abbotabad despite the presence of a large number of Hazaras there? The only possible answer is because he felt confident his security would be assured there. He could have got this confidence only if had the support of some sections of the local security agencies and/or the police and also of some local elements of the non-Hazara segment of the population. This is more speculative than of any evidentiary value. The direct evidence could come from the interrogation of those arrested alive from the mansion by the U.S. special forces.
Q: What impact this will have on U.S. relations with Pakistan?
A: The U.S. already has considerable suspicion that Pakistan has been playing a double game by dragging its feet on the issue of action against Al Qaeda. This suspicion will now be further strengthened. The smoking gun in the form of OBL's dead body has clearly established that OBL was living in an urban town of Pakistan. Was he living there with the knowledge or collusion of the Pakistani security agencies? There is no smoking gun on this yet. Unless that becoms available, the U.S. would find it difficult to act against the State of Pakistan. The relations will continue as before with ups and downs and with alternating praise for action taken and reprimands for actions not taken.
Q: Will the death of OBL be the end of Al Qaeda?
A: No.Since 9/11, Al Qaeda is already a weakened organisation due to repeated Drone strikes on its hide-outs and capture of some of its leaders on the ground in Pakistan. This process of weakening that has been there since 2002 could acquire pace and strength as a result of the death of OBL. Despite this, Al Qaeda, by itself, will remain a potent force for some years to come until it suffers more attrition.
Q: Will it have any impact on Obama's plans to start thinning out troops from Afghanistan? Will it enable or tempt Obama to accelerate the process?
A: No. Obama's decisions relating to Afghanistan will depend on the evolution of the ground situation in Afghanistan and on the proved ability of the Afghan National Army to withstand pressure from the Taliban.
Q: What are the dangers of reprisal attacks by Al Qaeda and its affiliates?
A: High in the Af-Pak region. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda affiliates like the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) will presume that the Pakistani security forces must have co-operated with the U.S. Acts of suicide terrorism against the Pakistani security forces and U.S. nationals and interests in Pakistan could increase.
High against U.S. nationals and interests in other countries.
Medium to low in the U.S. homeland. ( 2-5-11)
(Bahukutumbi Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
